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ARTICLE
CHARM CITY TELEVISED & DEHUMANIZED: HOW CCTV
BAIL REVIEWS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
By: 1 Edie Fortuna Cimino, 2 Zina Makar, 3 and Natalie Novak 4
INTRODUCTION
n May 28, 2013, Torrey Johnson 5 struggles to raise both his hands,
handcuffed and seated shoulder-to-shoulder between two other
defendants in the first row of the closed circuit television (“CCTV” or
“videoconference”) bail review hearing room within the Baltimore Central
Booking and Intake Center (“Centeral Booking”). There are two more rows
of defendants behind Mr. Johnson, all in yellow jumpsuits, being watched by
correctional officers. Separated by a three-foot wall, Mr. Johnson’s public
defender sits out of sight from the video camera’s field of view, about ten
feet away from her client. The judge quickly reads through Mr. Johnson’s
rights. A representative from the Pretrial Release Services Program
(“Pretrial Release”) makes a recommendation that is broadcasted meekly
from the courtroom. As the judge looks down at his desk to take notes, Mr.
Johnson looks down and shakes his head. He disagrees with something the
Pretrial Services representative said, and starts to speak. No one seems to
hear Mr. Johnson's voice in his own bail review hearing.
Mr. Johnson’s experience demonstrates the constitutional violations that
many indigent defendants in Baltimore City disproportionately face as
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Maryland conducts bail review hearings on a television screen, not in person.
Speed and convenience are the driving factors behind the state’s decision to
hold bail hearings through videoconference systems. Mr. Johnson’s case is
an example of the procedural problems raised when CCTV is used in bail
review hearings, both in district and circuit courts. 6
Many of Mr. Johnson’s rights were stripped away during his bail review
hearing. Denied the right to be physically present before a judge, Mr.
Johnson’s face was grainy and unrecognizable, while his bright yellow
jumpsuit fluoresced. Separated from his attorney by correctional officers, he
was unable to challenge the facts that the Pretrial Services representative
presented against him. He was disoriented without the guidance of his
attorney, who should have been within a whisper’s distance. In less than two
minutes, Mr. Johnson, unable to make the $50,000 bail, was denied the
opportunity to be released before his case is decided.
By contrast, Carl Gibson 7 was granted a bail review hearing in circuit
court, the trial court for his felony charge, approximately six months after he
was initially incarcerated. He was physically present in the courtroom
during his bail review hearing, accompanied by his attorney and his
girlfriend, who was nine months pregnant at the time. Mr. Gibson
communicated with his attorney throughout the hearing, providing
information to counter the representations made by Pretrial Services. His
attorney made arguments regarding his ties to the community and the
weakness of the case against him. Ultimately, Mr. Gibson was granted a
substantial reduction in money bail.
This article will discuss CCTV bail hearings that take place in district and
circuit courts. First, using Baltimore City as a case study, we will detail the
importance of pretrial release for trial outcomes and how lengthy pretrial
incarceration disproportionately affects both the poor and African-American
population. We will then argue that CCTV violates a defendant’s right to be
physically present within a courtroom, his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him, and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. These constitutional violations, when combined, deprive defendants
of their liberty without the due process of law.
I. RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE BAIL

6

See Md. R. 4-231 (permitting the use of videoconference systems in bail review
hearings that are held in district court). From August 2013 to submission of this
article for publication, bail review hearings and petitions for writs of habeas corpus
were being conducted in circuit court via CCTV. Any use of CCTV equipment in
bail review hearings before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is not permitted by
the express language of Maryland Rule 4-231.
7
The defendant’s name has been changed to protect client confidentiality.
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A. Lengthy Pretrial Incarceration Disproportionately Affects the Poor
and African-American Population
In Ake v. Oklahoma, Justice Marshall stated that “justice cannot be equal
where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake.” 8 Justice Marshall’s words are strikingly relevant to the
effects that CCTV has on indigent defendants in Baltimore City, where
pretrial detainees are overwhelmingly African-American and poor. 9 Surety
bail amounts are acutely significant to poor defendants. 10 When money for
food and rent is unsure, the extra expense of paying bail to a corporate
bondsman will be an extreme hardship. 11 In most situations, bail is paid by
the detainee’s friends and family. For the multigenerational poor, when the
bail amount skyrockets into the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of
dollars, freedom is out of reach. 12 Although loved ones may dearly want to
bring a detainee home, the money is just not there. 13 To an affluent
8

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
See Nastassia Walsh, Baltimore Behind Bars, JUSTICE POLICY INST. 15 (2010),
available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/1006_rep_baltbehindbars_md-ps-ac-rd.pdf (almost ninety percent of Baltimore City
detainees are African-American). See also Douglas L. Colbert et. al., Do Attorneys
Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1721 (2002) (lower income defendants tend to be
disproportionately African-American); Exectuive Summary to THE PRETRIAL
RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL
SYSTEM, ABELL FOUND. ii n.5 (Sept. 12, 2001) (hereinafter “ABELL FOUND.”),
available at
http://www.abell.org/sites/default/files/publications/hhs_pretrial_9.01%281%29.pdf
(“Seventy percent of interviewed arrestees for this Study reported that the expense of
the bondsmen’s fee would result in a delay paying rent and utilities and in buying
less food.”).
10
NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, NAPSA STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL
RELEASE 18 (3d ed. 2004), available at
http://www.napsa.org/publications/2004napsastandards.pdf (stating surety bail
systems “discriminate unfairly against the poor and middle-class persons who cannot
afford the non-refundable (and often very high) fees that the bondsman requires as a
condition of posting the bond”).
11
See ABELL FOUND., supra note 9. See also Walsh, supra note 9.
12
In advocating for the abolition of compensated sureties, the National Association
of Pretrial Services Agencies notes “[t]here is no reason to require defendants to
support bail bondsmen in order to obtain release (and to pay the bondsman a fee that
is not refundable even if they are ultimately cleared of the charges) . . . .” See NAT’L
ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 19.
13
See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES: 1994, (1998), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc94.pdf (study demonstrating the inverse
relationship between increasing bail amounts and the decreasing probability of
9
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defendant, the dollar amount of bail is less significant. 14 To avoid spending
even one night in Central Booking, most would consider paying a hefty sum
well worth it. 15
Unfortunately, a defendant’s ability to pay bail is rarely taken into
account by judges. Typically, a “reasonable bail” is assessed solely on the
allegations, a defendant’s criminal history, and his ties to the community. 16
However, under Stack v. Boyle, 17 the amount set for bail should be no more
than is necessary to assure the defendant’s presence at trial. Bail is collateral
to ensure court appearances, and should not be punishment for crimes yet to
be proven. The same dollar amount will be more important to recoup for an
indigent defendant than an affluent one; as such, indigence itself should be a
factor in favor of lower bail. 18 Because this connection often escapes
recognition, 19 it is all the more important that indigent defendants are granted
the full spectrum of their rights during bail review hearings. 20
release). See also BRIAN A. REAVES & PHENY Z. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES: 1992 (1995), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4120.
14
See Executive Summary to ABELL FOUND., supra note 9, at v n.15 (“According to
the 1995 national census, the median ([fiftieth] percentile) income for the typical
household in Baltimore ($42,021), Frederick ($51,220), Harford (48,467) and Prince
George’s ($45,281) counties was 75 to 100% higher than for Baltimore City
($25,918) . . . . Consequently, the same dollar amount is likely to represent a greater
financial hardship for individuals and families in Baltimore City.”).
15
See Sadhbh Walshe, America’s Bail System: One Law for the Rich, Another for
the Poor, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/14/america-bail-system-lawrich-poor (“Until we have the courage to change it, we should at least call bail by its
real name: a get-out-of-jail pass for those who can pay, and jail-time for those who
can't.”).
16
See Cynthia Jones, Give Us Free: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail
Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 919, 935 (2013).
17
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
18
See United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988). See also State
ex rel. Bardina v. Sandstrom, 321 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Mendenhall v. Sweat, 158 So. 280, 281-82 (Fla. 1934) (stating that a defendant’s
financial condition must be considered when instating a bail amount required to
assure the presence of the defendant).
19
During a bail review hearing on May 28, 2013, after argument by defense counsel,
Edie Cimino, that the defendant could not post the set amount of money bail, the
judge noted that the duty to set a reasonable bail, does not impose upon a judge a
duty to consider what bail amount the defendant could make.
20
Ronnie Thaxton, Injustice Telecast: The Illegal Use of Closed-Circuit Television
Arraignments and Bail Bond Hearings in Federal Court, 79 IOWA L. REV. 175, 19798 (1993) (“Criminal defendants, especially minorities, often feel they are
‘outsiders’ rather than participants in the adjudication of justice. Given the reality
that most racial minorities, especially Blacks, may already distrust and feel
intimidated by the criminal justice system, CC[TV]s provide another bar to their full
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Videoconference bail review hearings forsake the rights of the poor in the
name of convenience and efficiency.
B. Importance of Pretrial Release for Trial Outcomes
When an accused is incarcerated prior to his trial, he is held for a crime of
which he is presumed innocent, and forced to live in squalid conditions that
are worse than those where convicted criminals are held. 21 Pretrial
incarceration involves sleep deprivation, shockingly unsanitary conditions,
and violence. 22 A defendant’s countenance and posture will reflect those
experiences and convey a message to the court and jurors. The state system
has determined that he is guilty enough to keep locked up, and he wears that
badge of guilt when presented to the court via video during various pretrial
proceedings. 23

understanding of the proceedings and reinforce their distrust of the system. CC[TV]s
only further magnify this distrust and alienation.”).
21
Jonathan Zweig, Extraordinary Conditions of Release Under the Bail Reform Act,
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 555, 556 (2010) (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189,
1198 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[I]n a system that prides itself on a devotion to ‘equal justice
under the law’, [sic] it is difficult to maintain that conditions common in pretrial
detention centers do not punish defendants presumed innocent but that the more
wholesome conditions of minimum security prisons do punish convicted criminals.”)
(citations omitted) (quoting another source)).
22
James MacArthur, Jailed Journalist Reports Inhumane Conditions for Pre-Trial
Detainees, INDYPENDENT READER (Apr. 29, 2013),
https://indyreader.org/content/court-date-jailed-journalist-reports-inhumaneconditions-pre-trial-detainees.
23
See MICHAEL J. KELLY & EFREM LECY, MAKING THE “SYSTEM” WORK IN THE
BALTIMORE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN EVALUATION OF EARLY DISPOSITION
COURT 13 (2002), available at
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/004000/0046
07/unrestricted/20071518e.pdf (“The defendant threatens to burden the court with a
jury trial in order to negotiate a more favorable outcome through a plea bargain.
The prosecutor seeks to game the system as well, through increasing the penalties at
each new stage in the process, in order to negotiate a more severe penalty for the
defendant for burdening the system”). See also Commonwealth v. Bethea, 379 A.2d
102, 105 n.8 (Pa. 1977) (“Judge David Bazelon, speaking for the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, has suggested the shortcomings of these contentions:
‘Repentance has a role in penology. But the premise of our criminal jurisprudence
has always been that the time for repentance comes after trial. The adversary process
is a fact-finding engine, not a drama of contrition in which a prejudged defendant is
expected to knit up his lacerated bonds to society.’”). See also Steven P. Grossman,
An Honest Approach to Plea Bargaining, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 101 (2005)
(proposing a solution for and argues that differential sentencing of criminal
defendants who plead guilty and those that go to trial is a punishment for the
defendants exercising their right to trial).
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At the most basic level, a defendant’s decision-making process is fueled
by his traumatic experience in jail. In pretrial detention the defendant has
gone sleepless, unshowered, and scared for months. These conditions
present the defendant with an added incentive to plead guilty and accept a
sentence certain to result in his transfer to a classified institution. 24 There the
defendant can begin to count down the days to freedom. This certainty
brings a defendant relative peace of mind and ends the waiting, fearing the
worst, and hoping for finality.
While incarcerated, the accused cannot fully participate in preparing his
defense for trial. The defendant is unable to investigate his case, do legal
research, or even call his lawyer at a time of his choosing. 25 He can read
only what is provided to him and he cannot assist in locating witnesses. 26
Rather, he must wait for his attorney to visit him and, when she does,
chances are their meeting will not be confidential. 27 From his cell, the
defendant cannot assist in finding witnesses or accompany his lawyer on
crime scene investigations to show her where the incident occurred. Often
times, a client can educate their lawyer about the particular locations, such as
alleyways, backyards, and hangout spots, that are the subjects of the police
reports; however, without the defendant’s presence, the attorney must often
rely on guesswork and a hand-drawn map from her client. 28 Finding
witnesses is not always an exact science. For example, an accused may
know that there was a lady on her porch who saw the event, but not know her
name, address, or phone number. While the accused may recognize her face
or her house, the lawyer does not.

24

KELLY & LECY, supra note 23, at 13.
Interview with the Honorable Robert Cooper, J., Baltimore City District Court
(June 12, 2013) (Judge Cooper acknowledged that some witnesses in “Baltimore
City are very transient.” In the district court a trial must occur within thirty days of
arrest. Judge Cooper noted that this is a very limited time frame. If a defendant is
not on the streets looking for his potential witness because the defendant does not
make bail and remains incarcerated pending trial, then “[the defendant] will never
get him.”).
26
Id.
27
Jack Rubin, Letter to the Editor, Central Booking and Jail are Failing, BALT. SUN
(Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-08-07/news/bsed-jail-letter-20120807_1_deplorable-conditions-baltimore-city-detention-centerinterviews.
28
NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10 (“Upon a showing by
defense counsel of compelling necessity, including for matters related to preparation
of the defendant’s case, a judicial officer who entered an order of pretrial
detention . . . may permit the temporary release of a pretrial detained person to the
custody of a law enforcement or other court officer . . . [t]he burden is clearly on the
defense to prove the need for such release, which may be for matters relating to
preparation of the defendant’s case (for example, a site visit to a particular location,
providing an opportunity to review the scene with counsel) . . . .”).
25
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If a defendant is convicted after trial, the State’s sentencing
recommendation, and the one actually imposed, will be considerably higher
than if he were to accept a plea.29 Nearly every time a guilty verdict is
rendered, a “trial tax” is imposed by the sentencing judge. This is, in part,
due to the legislature’s enactment of various mandatory penalties that take
away judicial discretion, which the prosecutor may unilaterally invoke. 30 It
is also partly due to the personal and philosophical beliefs held by some
members of the bench, and may be an attempt to discourage jury trials to
prevent overcrowding an already crowded docket. Whatever the reason, a
defendant is not likely to gamble with his liberty by demanding a jury trial. 31
In addition to the pressures to plead guilty, applicable to all defendants,
pretrial incarceration creates further inducements for an accused to give up
his trial rights. 32
Several studies have demonstrated that “released
defendants tend to fare far better than those who are held in detention.” 33
Specifically, research shows that those “detained in jail while awaiting trial
plead guilty more often, are convicted more often, are sentenced to prison
more often, and receive harsher prison sentences than those who are released
during the pretrial period.” 34 Put another way, those who are not jailed
pending trial have much more favorable outcomes. 35
29

KELLY & LECY, supra note 23, at 12.
For example, fourth time drug offenders are subject to a forty-year mandatory
minimum if they have previously served three or more separate terms of
confinement as a result of three or more separate convictions. See generally
Grossman, supra note 23, at 110–15.
31
See Grossman, supra note 23, at 101 (citations omitted) (“The process by which
criminal convictions come about through guilty pleas in exchange for sentencing
considerations carries with it the almost inevitable result that those who refuse a plea
bargain are punished for exercising the right to trial. This punishment for exercising
the right to trial, and the deterrent impact that such a punishment creates for criminal
defendants considering whether to go to trial, take place not in rare instances but in
the overwhelming number of cases disposed of in federal and state criminal court
systems.”).
32
See Walshe, supra note 15 (quoting NORMAN REIMER, EXEC. DIR., NAT’L ASS’N
FOR CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS (“Bail is used as ransom to extract a guilty plea. Fact.”)).
33
See NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 9 (“Deprivation
of liberty pending trial . . . subjects the defendant to economic and psychological
hardship, interferes with their ability to defend themselves, and, in many
circumstances, deprives their families of support.”).
34
KRISTIN BECHTEL ET AL., DISPELLING THE MYTHS: WHAT POLICY MAKERS NEED
TO KNOW ABOUT PRETRIAL RESEARCH, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. (2012), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/download/pjireports/Dispelling%20the%20Myths%20(November%202012).pdf. See NAT’L
ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10; Stevens H. Clarke & Susan T.
Kurtz, The Importance of Interim Decisions to Felony Trial Court Dispositions, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 476, 503, 505 (1983) (A study of urban felony cases in
North Carolina “measured the effects of pretrial detention, controlling for
30
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II. THE CASE STUDY: BALTIMORE CITY
A. The Long Road to Circuit Court for a Felony Case
An individual faced with the unlucky experience of being arrested in
Baltimore City is physically presented to a district court commissioner for a
one-on-one interview within twenty-four hours of their arrest. 36 Initially,
bail is set by a commissioner, who is appointed by the Chief Judge of the
District Court of Maryland, but who is not necessarily a judge herself. 37 The
commissioner communicates with the defendant through a glass partition in
Central Booking, and decides whether to set bail, and if so, the appropriate
monetary value. 38
seriousness of charge, prior convictions, evidence against the defendant, and other
variables that might possibly affect both pretrial detention and court disposition . . . .
[T]he regression analysis [shows] that when two defendants and their cases were
alike, but one defendant spent more time in pretrial detention than the other, the
former defendant was less likely to have his charges dismissed than the latter and
was also more likely to receive a stiffer sentence if convicted.”); JOHN S.
GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 199 (1979) (In a multivariate regression analysis, the author
found a “rather pronounced relationship between defendants’ pretrial statuses and
their sentences . . . .” The study included 8,171 defendants in Philadelphia. Of those
who were convicted, whether in jail or out, 60% were placed on probation or given
other non-jail sentences, while 26% of those who were detained until conviction
were spared jail sentences.).
35
See Walshe, supra note 15 (quoting Robin Steinberg, Executive Director of the
Bronx Defenders: “If they have you in jail, the power has shifted to the prosecutorial
arm of the system, and they can force you to make a plea. If you are out of jail, the
power dynamic is completely different. Our research shows that when bail is posted,
at least half the cases are going to be dismissed outright and most will result in no
jail time at all. This is why prosecutors fight so desperately for bail.”).
36
See Press Release, Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., Public Defender’s
Office Drops Suit Against Central Booking and Intake Center: Agency
Acknowledges “24-hour rule” Violations Virtually Eliminated (Sept. 15, 2006),
available at http://dpscs.maryland.gov/publicinfo/pdfs/pressreleases/20060915.pdf
(dismissing the Baltimore City Public Defender’s Office’s class action suit against
Baltimore’s Central Booking and Intake Center for detaining arrestees for longer
than twenty-four hours before seeing a commissioner).
37
See ABELL FOUND., supra note 9, at n.75 (commissioners are not required to
achieve legal degrees; more than three of four Commissioners interviewed stated that
their legal training included a paralegal education; about 15% graduated from law
school, and one of five commissioners had taken some law school courses).
38
See Understanding the System, MD. OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEFENDER,
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Districts/Dist1/YDUHome/ClientFamilyResources/FAQ
s.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
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A charging document is issued to the defendant, which is frequently
prepared by the Baltimore City Police Officer who made the on scene arrest
and filed an affidavit describing the alleged illegal act.39 Thus, it is the
arresting officer who initially decides what crimes to charge the defendant
with, including whether they are misdemeanors or felonies. 40 An individual
could also be arrested because of a complaining witness’ sworn, handwritten
claim alleging that the individual committed a crime. 41 In that situation, a
39

Unfortunately, there are several documented instances of alleged and confirmed
dishonesty of members of the police force in Baltimore and nationally. See Michelle
Alexander, Opinion, Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-policeofficers-lie-under-oath.html?pagewanted=all. See also Justin Fenton, Baltimore
Police Officer Charged in Drug Corruption Case, BALT. SUN (May 31, 2013),
available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-31/news/bs-md-ci-policecorruption-indictment-20130531_1_drug-dealer-baltimore-police-officer-westbaltimore; Theo Emery, Baltimore Police Scandal Spotlights Leader’s Fight to Root
Out Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/us/baltimore-police-corruption-case-testscommissioner.html?_r=0; Jeff Hager, Baltimore’s Top Cop Turns to Outsiders to
Clean up Corruption Inside Police Department, ABC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/baltimores-top-cop-turns-tooutsiders-to-clean-up-corruption-inside-police-department; Patrick R. Lynch, Police
Misconduct: Signs of a Breakdown of Civil Society, BALT. SUN (Aug. 19, 2011),
available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-08-19/news/bs-ed-policeshooting-letter-20110819_1_police-misconduct-police-officer-civil-society; Justin
Fenton, Lead Detective in Barnes Case Charged in 2012 Incident, BALT. SUN (Apr.
29, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-04-29/news/bal-lead-detective-inphylicia-barnes-case-criminally-charged-in-2012-incident-20130429_1_phyliciabarnes-detective-daniel-t-detective-nicholson; Justin Fenton, Baltimore Officer
Pleads Guilty to Armed Drug Conspiracy, BALT. SUN (Mar. 11, 2013), available at
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-11/news/bs-md-ci-police-officer-plearichburg-20130311_1_kendell-richburg-informant-baltimore-officer; Justin Fenton,
Baltimore Police Officer Charged with Lying in Search Warrant, BALT. SUN (Nov.
2, 2012), available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-11-02/news/bs-md-cicity-officer-perjury-20121101_1_search-warrant-misconduct-charges-baltimorepolice-officer.
40
MD. RULE § 4-211 (outlining the methods of charging).
41
Id.; Who Does What in District Court, MDCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/selfhelp/whodoeswhat.html (last visited Sept.
26, 2014) (many people are surprised to learn that, in Maryland, a private citizen,
without any police involvement, can appear before a district court commissioner, any
time of day or night, to apply for criminal charges to be issued against another
individual; the commissioner decides whether a warrant or summons will issue: “If
warrant is issued, the document will be given to a law enforcement agency, which is
responsible for finding and arresting the accused person.”). This system arguably
sets up a mechanism for private persons to use the criminal justice system as a
weapon in interpersonal relationships. See State v. Smith, 305 Md. 489, 505 A.2d
511(1986) (holding that a district court commissioner, acting on an affidavit of a
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district court commissioner will “review the application to determine
whether a crime has been committed and if there is reason to believe that
the . . . accused committed the crime. If the commissioner determines that
there is probable cause, a charging document is issued.” 42
When a commissioner approves the misdemeanor charges issued against
an individual, the trial date will be set approximately thirty days after the
arrest. At that time the individual would receive the State’s offer and have
the opportunity to have a trial before a district court judge, pray a jury trial, 43
or accept a guilty plea. 44
When charged with certain felonies, 45 Maryland law prohibits and
individual from being tried in district court, the court in which bail was set.46
Under these circumstances, the district court has no jurisdiction. After a
preliminary hearing or an indictment by a grand jury, the felony case would
be heard in circuit court, where the defendant is afforded the right to a jury
trial. 47
The Maryland Rules require that a preliminary hearing, where live
witnesses are required to testify before a judge in support of the State’s case,
must take place within thirty days of a defendant’s timely request. 48 At that
time, a judge must decide if probable cause exists to support the felony
charge. If the district court judge finds probable cause, the State must file a
charging document in circuit court within thirty days. 49
The State’s Attorney for Baltimore City seems to have adopted a policy of
indicting felony cases in lieu of presenting live witnesses at preliminary
hearings. 50 There is no time requirement for the filing of an indictment
private citizen, was authorized to issue a warrant, and that such an issuance did not
violate the defendant’s due process rights).
42
Who Does What in District Court, supra note 41.
43
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2)(i)-(ii) (stating someone who is
charged with a misdemeanor which carries more than ninety days of incarceration as
a maximum penalty has the option of praying a jury trial, in which case the case
would be forwarded to the circuit court).
44
Md. R. 4-211(b)(1).
45
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(a).
46
Id. § 4-302(e)(2)(i).
47
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § § 4-102, 103.
48
Md. R. 4-211(b)(1); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-103.
49
Md. R. 4-221(f)(1).
50
This has been the experience of the Authors of this Article. See also MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-103(c)(2) (“If the defendant is charged by grand
jury indictment, the right of a defendant to a preliminary hearing is not absolute but
the court may allow the defendant to have a preliminary hearing.”). See also United
States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a
grand jury acts as a “rubber stamp” and “affirms what the prosecutor calls upon it to
affirm—investigating as it is led, ignoring what it is never advised to notice, failing
to indict or indicting as the prosecutor ‘submits’ that it should” (quoting Marvin E.
Frankel & Gary Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial, 9, (Farrar Straus

2014]

Charm City Televised & Dehumanized

67

under Maryland statutory law. In fact, the Maryland Rules and the Criminal
Procedure Article are both relatively silent on the subject of indictment—no
guideposts exist for how the grand jury is convened, what the standard of
proof is, or any filing deadlines. 51
If your case is in felony status, then by the time you have wend your way
through the process to arrive in circuit court, more than ninety days will have
typically passed. 52 The video bail review hearing in district court will
determine the amount of money necessary to gain your freedom. An
individual unable to post the designated amount of bail, as set by the district
court during the video bail proceeding, may lose his liberty before the
government has even “committed itself to prosecute” by filing an indictment
(the charging document on which a defendant is “subject to be tried . . . ”). 53
B. The Importance of a Bail Review Hearing for Felony Cases in a
General Jurisdiction Court: 54 Speedy Trial Concerns
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a speedy trial.
One of the primary purposes of this right is “to prevent undue and oppressive

Giroux) (1977))); People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 124-25 (1990) ( Titone, J.,
dissenting) (Arguing that the prosecutor who presented the case to a grand jury was
unlicensed but the majority held that this did not undermine the underlying
prosecutorial jurisdiction; Titone, J., dissenting, notes that “a Grand Jury can indict
anyone or anything—even a ham sandwich. Now, under the majority's holding,
apparently anyone can present the People's case to the Grand Jury—even an
unadmitted layperson masquerading as an attorney.”).
51
Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 643, 774 A.2d 1136, 1155 (2001) (“Maryland has no
statute prescribing a time limit for seeking an indictment for felonies and
penitentiary misdemeanors.”). But see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
SPEEDY TRIAL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES 8 (3d ed. 2006) (“An
indictment, information, or other formal charging instrument should be filed within
thirty days after the defendant's first appearance in court after either an arrest or
issuance of a citation or summons . . . .”).
52
See Walsh, supra note 9, at 40.
53
State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 574-75, 471 A.2d 712, 716 (1984). But see Vernon’s
Ann.Texas C.C.P. Art. 12.01, 17.151 (2013) (requiring that a “defendant who is
detained in jail pending trial of an accusation against him must be released either on
personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for
trial of the criminal action for which he is being detained within . . . [ninety] days
from the commencement of his detention if he is accused of a felony . . . ”; Texas
also outlines time limits within which a case must be indicted, even when the
accused is released on his own recognizance).
54
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §1-501 (explaining that the Circuit Court is also
referred to as a court of original jurisdiction and that “[t]he circuit courts are the
highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction
within the State.”); Walsh, supra note 9, at 39 (describing the unlimited jurisdiction).

68

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 44.2

incarceration prior to trial . . . .” 55 The four-factor test of Barker v. Wingo 56
is used to determine whether a case should be dismissed for the lack of a
speedy trial. 57 The “speedy trial clock” starts upon “a formal indictment or
information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to
answer a criminal charge . . . .” 58 As discussed, the district court does not
have jurisdiction over felony cases. 59 The defendant cannot be tried on a
statement of probable cause, which is “an accusation made by a peace officer
or other person.” 60 Therefore, the speedy trial clock for a felony does not
start upon filing of a statement of probable cause alone, but upon the arrest
alleged in the charging document. 61
Multiple postponements in felony cases are common in the Circuit Court
of Maryland for Baltimore City. 62 Frequently, cases are postponed due to a
lack of court availability, despite neither party requesting additional time. 63
In analyzing a constitutional speedy trial claim, overcrowded courts are
considered a more neutral reason, but “nevertheless should be considered
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant.” 64 Many times, the State or the
defense requests a postponement to complete more investigation, which
sometimes is a result of high caseloads faced by both sides. 65
In addition to the constitutional right to a speedy trial, Maryland Rule 4271 requires that a trial be granted within one hundred eighty days of

55

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (citing United States v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
56
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972).
57
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984) (quoting United States v.
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)). See Part VI, infra, for a discussion of other due
process violations in the context of video bail review hearings (arguing that the
defendant has a due process right to a speedy trial, which is implicated when the
defendant appears on video for his bail review hearing, since (1) video bail hearings
increase the risk of pretrial incarceration and (2) as the Supreme Court has stated, the
“speedy trial right exists primarily to protect an individual's liberty interest, ‘to
minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial . . . ’”).
58
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
59
See supra Part II.A.
60
State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 572, 471 A.2d 712, 715 (1984).
61
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 8.
62
See Walsh, supra note 9, at 39.
63
See id.
64
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
65
Wilson v. State, 44 Md.App. 1, 10-11, 408 A.2d. 102, 108 (1979) (“[D]elay
caused by the reasonable preparation and orderly process of the case for some
undetermined period will not be weighed against the State.”). But see Barker, 407
U.S. at 531 (“[O]vercrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must
rest with the government rather than with the defendant.”).
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arraignment 66 or the date that counsel for defendant filed their written
appearance. 67 For a case to be postponed past the one hundred eighty day
deadline, or the “Hicks date,” an administrative judge must find good cause
for the delay. 68 In enacting Maryland Rule 4-271, the Maryland “Legislature
intended [to] prevent chronic delay,” but when the delay is due to “an
isolated instance rather than a recurring problem” a finding of good cause is
within the administrative judge’s discretion. 69 Few practitioners would
disagree that the court is chronically congested, and defense lawyers must
warn their clients about the possibility of no court being available resulting
in a postponement. 70 Regardless of the chronic congestion against which
Maryland Rule 4-271 was designed to protect, judges in Baltimore City will
routinely find good cause for a postponement when there is no court
available. 71
The Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City sporadically operates
under a “Differentiated Case Management System” (“DCM”) that outlines
the prescribed length of delay from arraignment to trial date for different
categories of cases. 72 The focus of the DCM system is the anticipated length
of the trial. Under the DCM, if the trial is expected to take less than three
66

Md. R. § 4-271.
Id.
68
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979) (holding that
dismissal of criminal charges is the appropriate sanction where the State fails to
bring the case to trial within the one hundred twenty day period prescribed by the
rule and where “extraordinary cause” justifying a trial postponement has not been
established).
69
State v. Toney, 315 Md. 122, 134, 553 A.2d 696, 702 (1989) (quoting State v.
Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 463, 470 A.2d 1269, 1290 (1984)(emphasis added)). See also
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 50 (“Delay resulting
from chronic congestion of the docket or from failure of the prosecutor to be
prepared to go to trial within the allowable period should not be excused.”).
70
Dennis Laye, an experienced defense attorney practicing in Baltimore City,
remarked, “I advise my incarcerated clients that they will wait at least a year, quite
possibly two, before they get a jury trial.” Personal Interview, August 9, 2013. But
see Frazier, 298 Md. at 458, 470 A.2d at 1288 (explaining that Baltimore City at the
time of the trial was not “chronically congested” as the “average disposition time for
a criminal case [was] 139 days after filing” and, “the proportion of criminal cases
which must be postponed by the administrative judge beyond the 180-day deadline,
and in which the defendant did not seek or expressly consent to such postponement,
[was] less than two percent.”). At the time of publication, officials from the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City and Judicial Information Systems in Annapolis, Maryland
both indicated that the complete data of the sort cited in Frazier was not available.
The circuit court did provide the statistic that the average time from filing to
disposition was 228 days.
71
State v. Bonev, 299 Md. 79, 81, 472 A.2d 476 (1984).
72
CIRCUIT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR BALTIMORE CITY,
http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/criminal/crim-pract.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
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days, the first trial date should be set within sixty days after the arraignment,
while cases that involve “serious personal injury or death” should have a trial
date set within one hundred twenty days after the arraignment. 73 Despite
standards implemented by both the American Bar Association and the
National Association of Pretrial Service Agencies distinguishing detained
defendants from those on bail for purposes of scheduling, Baltimore City’s
DCM system does not consider a defendant’s incarceration as a factor. 74
Regardless of the reasons for the delay, a defendant who cannot post bail
is likely to wait a year or more before being given a trial. Maryland has a
two-tier system, “with a limited jurisdiction court responsible for initial
proceedings in felony cases and a general jurisdiction court receiving the
case only after an indictment or other formal charging instrument has been
filed . . . .” 75 In this system, “issues related to the defendant’s custody status
are typically addressed first in a limited jurisdiction court (at the defendant’s
first appearance following arrest) and again at the formal arraignment on a
felony indictment or information in the original jurisdiction court.” 76
These “re-reviews” of custody status only occur in the Circuit Court of
Maryland for Baltimore City upon a written motion by the defendant. 77 In

73

Id.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 2(“In establishing
statutes or rules for speedy trial and goals and practices for timely resolution of
criminal cases, jurisdictions should . . . distinguish between defendants in detention
and defendants on pretrial release. The time limits concerning speedy trial for
detained defendants should ordinarily be shorter than the limits applicable to
defendants on pretrial release.”). See also THE NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV.
AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 3 (“Every jurisdiction should establish, by statute or
court rule, accelerated time limitations within which detained defendants should be
tried consistent with the sound administration of justice. These accelerated time
limitations should be shorter than current speedy trial time limitations applicable to
defendants on pretrial release. The failure to try a detained defendant within such
accelerated time limitations should result in the defendant’s immediate release from
detention under reasonable conditions that best minimize the risk of flight and
danger to the community pending trial, unless the delay is attributable to or agreed to
by the defendant.”).
75
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 58.
76
THE NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 3.
77
Md. R. § 4-216.1(c) (“[s]upervision of detention pending trial. In order to
eliminate unnecessary detention, the court shall exercise supervision over the
detention of defendants pending trial. It shall require from the sheriff, warden, or
other custodial officer a weekly report listing each defendant within its jurisdiction
who has been held in custody in excess of seven days pending preliminary hearing,
trial, sentencing, or appeal. The report shall give the reason for the detention of each
defendant.”).
74
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practice the onus is placed on the defendant to rebut an unspoken
presumption of lengthy pretrial incarceration. 78
The strain on the right to a speedy trial makes the need for a meaningful
initial appearance even more pronounced. For reasons discussed below,
CCTV bail review hearings lack the necessary safeguards and, therefore,
result in erroneous deprivation of liberty.
III. DEHUMANIZING EFFECTS OF CCTV ON THE ACCUSED
A. How CCTV Communication Affects Perception
Videoconferencing has been proven to negatively affect perceptions of
those depicted in several arenas both inside and outside of the criminal
justice system. This section will discuss concepts in social science that
explain how personal interactions, from brief encounters to relationships that
develop over the course of a lifetime, are based on the ability to experience
another’s identity and allow people to form judgments of one another.
Creating a social interaction in which one can perceive another’s identity is
what “engenders feelings of engagement or connectedness.” 79 Social
interactions are most authentic when individuals can experience one
another’s identity in a way that reminds them of their own humanity or when
they are able to form an attachment to another. 80
Videoconferencing, as a vehicle for communication, cannot replicate
face-to-face communication in real time, despite constant innovation.81 A
technology-based mode of communication creates distance between the
interactants, which deprives them of “the richness of social and sensory
information that is available face to face.” 82
78

Md. R. § 4-252 (“[M]atters shall be raised by motion in conformity with this Rule
and if not so raised are waived unless the court, for good cause shown, orders
otherwise.”).
79
Bjorn Bengtsson et al., The Impact of Anthropomorphic Interfaces on Influence,
Understanding, and Credibility, 32 ANN. HAW. INT'L. CONF. SYSTEMS SCI. 1, 3
(1999) (“Normal interaction is comprised of the identities of individuals involved in
interaction. Identity creates an impression of the social, which in turn engenders
feelings of engagement or connectedness.”).
80
Id. at 5 (“Social interaction with technology seems to arise from the general
psychological tendency of people to response socially in situations in which they are
reminded of their own humanity or social selves, or in which they form an
attachment to another.”).
81
See Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly Line
Justice? The Use of Teleconference in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 259, 267–69 (2008).
82
Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 3 (Researchers found that “despite
technological advances that are constantly expanding the frontiers of what is
feasible, at present computes still interact awkwardly. They are unable to supply the
kind of contingent and fully synchronous interaction that is present in face-to-face
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This concept applies to the interaction that occurs when a defendant
comes before a judge. The judge’s social interaction with the defendant will
influence the defendant’s perceived credibility, truthfulness, and
dangerousness. 83 If the interaction between the judge and defendant fails to
develop or is critically impaired, they will be unable to adequately
experience each other’s humanity. In-person interactions are crucial to
making these determinations because the synchronistic nature of interaction
allows individuals to continuously tailor their speech and conduct to increase
their appearance of credibility. 84 Therefore, it is essential that “the judge []
come face-to-face with the primary informational sources, and probe for
what is obscure, trap what is elusive, and settle what is controversial.” 85
A psychological study found that participants who communicated through
a computer program, as opposed to in-person, perceived the computer-based
communication to be significantly less credible.86 This study also found that
in-person interactions were seen as “more sociable, likeable, dynamic, and
truthful.” 87 In another study, researchers found that mock jurors, who rated
the testimony of child witnesses testifying in court against testimony via
closed-circuit video, found the in-court testimony to be more believable,
despite the fact that the closed-circuit video testimony was actually more
accurate. 88 Child witnesses who testify in court have also been found to be
more accurate, intelligent, attractive, and honest than closed-circuit video
testimony. 89 The same study found that jurors were more likely to render a

conversation. Moreover, the sheer interjection of an electronic medium may
‘distance’ interactants relative to face-to-face interaction. And computer agents, even
in multimedia form, do not supply the richness of social and sensory information that
is available face-to-face.”).
83
See id. at 266 (“All aspects of the witness's demeanor-including the expression of
his countenance, how he sits or stands, whether he is inordinately nervous, his
coloration during critical examination, the modulation or pace of his speech and
other nonverbal communication-may convince the observing trial judge that the
witness is testifying truthfully or falsely.”).
84
Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 4 (“It is plausible that humans have more
behavioral resources at their disposal to achieve an appealing and credible demeanor
and that they are better able to adapt their conversation if there are indications that
their image is suffering.”).
85
United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
86
Id. at 12.
87
Id. at 11 (“Consistent with the argument that social identification is a key
consideration in assessing communication formats, partners were seen as more
sociable, likeable, dynamic, and truthful when participants engaged in face to face
than human-computer interaction.”).
88
Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Videoconferencing in Criminal
Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research, 28 LAW &
POL’Y 211, 221 (2006).
89
Id.
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guilty verdict when the child witness testified in court. 90 Across disciplines,
studies have found that real time interactions are more impactful than the
video facsimile and the fact-finder’s ability to assess characteristics of the
defendant via video are critically impaired. 91
Social interaction is comprised of infinite verbal and nonverbal cues.
Videoconference bail reviews limit the amount of available information that
would be useful to the judge in making a pretrial release determination. 92
Face-to-face communication allows participants to incorporate nonverbal
expression into the interpersonal exchange. 93 A defendant’s eye contact,
posture, and gestures may not be accurately transmitted to the judge, yet
these signals provide valuable insight into the defendant’s character. 94
Research suggests that viewing gestures and other nonverbal communication
can aid the viewer’s comprehension and increase the likeability of the
speaker. 95
Specifically, research has found that eye contact influences the speaker’s
perceived credibility and trustworthiness.96 Eye contact is one of the most
important nonverbal gestures that can foster feelings of connectedness. 97
Witnesses who maintain continuous eye contact with their communication
target were considered more credible than the witnesses who held a
downward gaze. 98 Some individuals even associate a downward gaze with
deception or distrust. 99 The logistics of a videoconference interaction makes
eye contact impossible, further aggravating the judge’s ability to form an
adequate assessment of the defendant on the other end of the camera.100
Voice cues, as well as nonverbal expression, are also altered by the use of
videoconference technology. 101 Video technology can diminish or amplify
the defendant’s affect, thus impacting the judge’s perception of the
90

Id. at 221-22.
See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of
Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
869, 879 (2010).
92
Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 268.
93
Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 6 (“Additionally, humans have greater ability to
be nonverbally expressive and energetic, which may gain them benefits in terms of
dynamism.”).
94
Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 215.
95
Id. at 222.
96
Id. at 268–69.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 222 (“These findings are relevant in that a defendant participating in a
videoconferenced proceeding might naturally direct his attention to the terminal
present at his location, rather than directly into the camera, thus making him appear
to be averting his gaze.”).
99
Id.
100
Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 222; see also Walsh & Walsh,
supra note 81, at 268–69.
101
Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 216.
91
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defendant. 102 Emotion is often conveyed in the lowest and highest vocal
frequencies, which is partially lost in video transmission. 103 This hinders the
defendant’s ability to show remorse or demonstrate credibility. 104 A psychosocial study concluded: “Overall, it would appear that face-to-face
interaction is best for generating positive social judgments and interpersonal
relationships.” 105
The most troubling aspect of videoconference bail hearings is the physical
distance between the judge and the defendant that causes the defendant to be
dehumanized. 106 Impaired perception, diminished credibility, and inability to
view nonverbal cues diminish the social interaction between the judge and
defendant. Psychologists have found that “perceive[ing] another in terms of
common humanity activates empathetic emotional reactions through
perceived similarity and a sense of social obligation.” 107 If “[m]oral actions
are the products of the reciprocal interplay of personal and social
influences[,]” then a judge, his perception of the defendant as a full, social
person now impeded, is less likely to take the "moral action.” 108 With
CCTV, a judge will be less likely to consider an accused’s life circumstances
or the impact that incarceration will have on him, reducing his chance of
pretrial release. 109
B. Filling in the Gaps of Larose: 110 Empirical Evidence from the Cook
County and Asylum Hearings
Others have argued that video bail reviews deny defendants due
process. 111 Larose, a 1997 case, is the only opinion in the United States that
deals with the constitutionality of video bail reviews. 112 The Larose court
held that “bail hearings concern a legally protected interest,” but reasoned
that the petitioners failed to show that the video bail procedure resulted in a
102

Id.; See also Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 268.
Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 216.
104
Id.
105
Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 13–14.
106
See Seidman Diamond, supra note 91, at 879. See also Walsh & Walsh, supra
note 81, at 269.
107
Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 200 (1999).
108
Id. at 207.
109
Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 269.
110
Larose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough Cnty. Corr. Admin., 702 A.2d 326 (N.H.
1997).
111
Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 215 (“Some commentators have
argued that, because of the effects of videoconferencing on the behavior and
perceptions of participants in a criminal proceeding, its use amounts to a denial of
due process for the defendant.”).
112
Larose, 702 A.2d 326.
103
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“greater risk of erroneous deprivation of that liberty” as enumerated in the
Matthews v. Eldridge test. 113 No data was presented to demonstrate that
technology based hearings adversely affected the defendant’s liberty
interest. 114
The Larose court considered the testimony of the petitioners’ expert
witness, a psychologist, who opined that “teleconferencing procedure would
adversely bias a judge’s opinion of a defendant” even though “he testified
that he had never seen a tape of a video bail hearing, [] none of the articles to
which he referred related directly to the issue, and that he had never spoken
with either a judge or a defendant who had participated in such a hearing.” 115
The court considered a defense attorney’s testimony that “conducting a bail
hearing by video affected his ability to be an effective advocate for a client
‘to some extent[,]’” but that “he had no knowledge of how the video bail
hearings were currently being conducted . . . .” 116
A subsequent study demonstrates that videoconference bail review
hearings result in significantly higher bails than live hearings.117 In 1999, the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois issued a general order requiring that
bail reviews, with limited cases excepted, “be conducted by means of closed
circuit television.” 118 In 2006, Locke Bowman of the MacArthur Justice
Center filed a class action lawsuit, and a study was later conducted to
analyze how video bail hearings affected outcomes. 119 Locke Bowman and
Shari Diamond gathered information from the Cook County Clerk’s Office
regarding cases eight and one half years prior to the video bails and eight and
one half years after. 120 A study of 645,117 cases revealed “average bond
amount for the offenses that shifted to televised hearings increased by an
average of 51% across all of the CCTV cases.” 121 The same study noted that
“increases of between 54% and 90% occurred for six major felonies
subjected to the CCTV.” 122 Through statistical analysis, the researchers
concluded that the “change cannot be attributed to general trends or seasonal
variations.” 123 Cook County voluntarily halted its use of CCTV bond
hearings on December 15, 2008. 124 One observer noted:

113

Id. at 329. See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text.
Larose, 702 A.2d at 329
115
Id.
116
Id. at 328–29.
117
See Diamond, supra note 91, at 870.
118
Id. at 883.
119
Id. at 886.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 897.
114

122

Id.
Diamond, supra note 91, at 897 (“Indeed, results show that immediately after the
[closed circuit television procedure] went into effect, the average bond amount for
123
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The substantial increases in bail levels that immediately
followed the implementation of videoconferenced bail
hearings in Cook County, and which occurred only for the
offenses that shifted to videoconferenced hearings, provide
precisely the evidence that was missing in Larose 125 and
should raise questions about the harmful effects of
videoconferenced hearings on defendants. 126
In the context of immigration court, CCTV hearings have yielded similar
results. A statistical analysis of the outcome of over 500,000 asylum
removal hearings showed that in-person litigants fare substantially better
than those who appear on camera. 127 Data from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review indicated that the “grant rate for asylum applicants
whose cases were heard in-person is roughly double the grant rate for the
applicants whose cases were heard via [CCTV].” 128 It should be noted that
even when controlling for the variable of counsel, there was still a
statistically significant difference in outcome between live and televised
asylum hearings. 129 Represented applicants who appeared in person showed
a 38% chance of having their application granted, while those represented
applicants who appeared via video had only a 23% chance of gaining
asylum. 130
IV. DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS AGAINST CCTV FOR BAIL REVIEWS OF
FELONY CASES
Those whom we would banish from society or from the
human community itself often speak in too faint a voice to
be heard above society’s demand for punishment. It is the
particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the

the non-treated felonies rose an insignificant 13% (see Figure 8 and Table 1), while
the average for treated felonies rose a significant 51%.”).
124
Id.
125
Larose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough Cnty. Corr. Admin., 702 A.2d 326, 329
(N.H. 1997) (holding that videoconference bail review hearings did not violate due
process, as “[n]o evidence was offered to suggest that judges set bail at a higher
amount for defendants who were arraigned by the video procedures than by inperson procedures.”).
126
Diamond, supra note 91, at 898.
127
Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 259.
128
Id. at 271.
129
Id. at 271–72.
130
Id. at 272.
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Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not
alone dictate the conditions of social life. 131
Bail review hearings are intended to secure the accused’s appearance at
trial. Modern day conveniences are transforming the culture of bail review
hearings, minimizing the role the defendant plays in one of the most crucial
stages preceding his trial. At a videoconference bail review hearing, many
defendants lose their freedom without being afforded procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 132 Without these necessary
protections, the risk that defendants are deprived of liberty without due
process of law increases. Pretrial incarceration impacts the financial,
emotional, and physical well-being of detainees and undermines their
confidence in the criminal justice system. 133
This section will discuss the constitutional violations of CCTV bail
review hearings, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
defendants’ right to be physically present at the hearing, and their right to
confront the witnesses against them. Videoconference hearings erode the
safeguards inherent in live hearings, thereby denying the accused their right
to due process of law when their liberty is on the line.
Not every defendant’s experience is identical. Therefore, it is important
to note that, while all of the violations identified are relevant, they exist
collectively in varying degrees based on the particular circumstances
surrounding the administration of the hearing. Due Process is a prism
through which these constitutional and common law rights will be viewed.
The rights discussed exist to protect liberty. When they are violated, the risk
of erroneous deprivation of liberty increases.
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Ethical Considerations
Representing indigent defendants in their first appearance in Baltimore
City is a task that takes on a frenzied pace. Public Defender Management
arrives at Central Booking at around 7:15 a.m. to prepare the docket for the
attorneys, who arrive shortly thereafter. Each docket consists of ten or more
felony and misdemeanor cases. The attorneys study the charging documents,
manually research their clients’ criminal history; and attempt to call family
and employers to verify defenses, ties to the community, and to inquire if
bail will be posted on the defendants’ behalf. By 11:00 a.m., the attorney is
ready to meet with her clients and begin the interviews. A meaningful
131

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 273.
133
See generally Walsh, supra note 9, at 27 (“Even a short stint in jail can disrupt a
person’s employment, education, and housing and exacerbate existing health
conditions (or create new ones) . . . .”). See also Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of
the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C. R.- C. L. L. REV. 259 (2013).
132
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interview lasts about fifteen minutes, yet if the attorney expects to reach the
courthouse from the jail before the docket begins, fifteen minutes per client
is too much time spent. 134
The time constraints CCTV imposes on an attorney undoubtedly have a
critical impact on the effectiveness of his representation. 135 Every day public
defenders in Baltimore City face a reoccurring dilemma: Whether to sacrifice
time with their client 136 or their physical presence before the judge. 137
Neither situation is adequate. Once the initial client interview is over, the
accused is banished from his attorney’s side and denied access to counsel.
i. CCTV Denies the Accused Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant has a right to the
effective assistance of counsel, 138, and “unrestricted access” 139 thereof. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court guaranteed indigent defendants
the right to appointed counsel; this right is extended to the states by the Due
134

CCTV bail review dockets occur in two courthouses: John R. Hargrove, Sr.
Building (Southern), which is approximately 5 miles from Central Booking, and
Borgerding District Court Building (Wabash), which is approximately 9 miles from
Central Booking. The Southern docket is comprised of women, and begins at 1:00
p.m. . The Wabash docket begins at 2:00 p.m.
135
In a private interview with Judge Braverman, he discussed a common perception:
that private attorneys can often be more effective than public defenders in the bail
review setting because they are only committed to a single client. A private attorney
has more resources and time to verify the client’s facts and is more likely to present
compelling information that may appeal to the judge during the hearing. Interview
with the Honorable Judge Nathan Braverman, District Court of Maryland for
Baltimore City (June 18, 2013).
136
Zachary M. Hillman, Is a Defendant Constitutionally “Present” when Pleading
Guilty by Video Teleconference?, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 41, 63 (2007). (“One public
defender summed up the situation succinctly: ‘An attorney can’t be two places at
once; we don’t want to leave the client alone.’”).
137
Public Defenders are not mandated to be present at the accused’s case before a
judge. The decision to remain in Central Booking is purely one for the attorney to
decide. See Thaxton, supra note 20, at 192 (footnotes omitted) (“[P]lacing the
defense counsel in the jail with the defendant denies counsel the opportunity for a
full exchange with the judge and the prosecuting attorney.”).
138
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Supreme Court has not
explicitly extended Sixth Amendment right to counsel to an initial bail review
hearing. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty, 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008) (requiring states to
not unreasonably delay the assigning of counsel, not necessarily establishing a U.S.
Constitutional right to counsel at bail reviews).
139
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989) (“It is the defendant's right to
unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related matters that is
controlling in the context of a long recess.”). See generally Geders v. United States,
425 U.S. 80 (1976).
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 140 Effectiveness of counsel is
interdependent on the defendant’s presence, and as such, the defendant’s
right to counsel, explicitly provided for by Maryland Rule 4-216(e) et seq.,
will not be fulfilled during a video bail conference. 141
The right to counsel first attaches upon the “initiation of adversarial
judicial criminal proceedings . . . ,” and then, only during a critical stage. 142
In 2012, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in DeWolfe v. Richmond
(“DeWolfe I”) that the Public Defender Act mandates that the Maryland
Office of the Public Defender provide representation to indigent defendants
at bail review hearings, in addition to initial appearances. 143 Immediately
after DeWolfe I 144 was decided, the Maryland General Assembly amended
140

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The Supreme Court, in Halbert v. Michigan, highlighted data to support its
conclusion that if indigent defendants, convicted after guilty pleas, did not have
counsel to guide them through the State’s complex appellate process, their right to
appeal would be meaningless:

141

[Sixty-eight percent] of the state prison populatio[n] did not
complete high school, and many lack the most basic literacy
skills. . . . [S]even out of ten inmates fall in the lowest two out of
five levels of literacy-marked by an inability to do such basic tasks
as write a brief letter to explain an error on a credit card bill, use a
bus schedule, or state in writing an argument made in a lengthy
newspaper article.
545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005) (holding that the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses required the state to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to
the state appellate court) (citing A. BECK & L. MARUSCHAK, Mental Health
Treatment in State Prisons, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
pp. 3–4 (Jul. 2001), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf.); see also MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 16-209(a) ( “Communications between an indigent individual and an
individual in the Office or engaged by the Public Defender are protected by the
attorney-client privilege to the same extent as though an attorney had been privately
engaged.”)).
142
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel did not attach in an identification that took place before the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings).
143
DeWolfe v. Richmond, 434 Md. 403, 430-31, 76 A.3d 962, 978 (2012)
(hereinafter “DeWolfe I”); Public Defender Act, MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16204(b)(2)(i) (stating that representation shall be provided to an indigent individual in
all stages of a proceeding, including a bail hearing before a district court or circuit
court judge). This paper will not analyze whether, in fact, bail review is a critical
stage, but it is assumed that the Maryland State Legislature found it critical enough
to deem representation by counsel necessary during this stage.
144
See generally DeWolfe I, 434 Md. 403, 76 A.3d 962; Public Defender Act, MD
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2)(i).

80

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 44.2

the Public Defender Act to exclude the guarantee of counsel from the
defendant’s initial appearance before a commissioner. 145 The legislature,
however, left intact the guarantee to assistance of counsel during the bail
review stage. 146
While the Supreme Court has not held bail review hearings to be a critical
stage, in a recent 2013 case superseding DeWolfe I, 147 the same court found
that Maryland criminal defendants have a due process right under the due
process component of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to counsel at their
initial bail hearings. 148 The decision holds significant implications for
ensuring indigent defendants retain all constitutional safeguards guaranteed
during all stages of the trial. 149 Early intervention by an attorney, such as
during the bail review stage, has a substantial impact on the outcome of the
pretrial hearing, as well as the outcome of the trial.150
In most cases “if the defendant has a constitutional right to be present . . .
undoubtedly he has a constitutional right to . . . counsel at such time.” 151 The
case in Baltimore City poses a unique situation. The Maryland Legislature
has implicitly reaffirmed its belief that bail review hearings are a critical
stage. Just as the right to counsel flows from the right to presence, so does
the right to presence flow from the right to counsel. Case law supports the
inference that “an essential concomitant of a defendant’s right to effective

145

Public Defender Act, MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2)(ii).
Id.
147
DeWolfe, 434 Md. 403, 76 A.3d 962, on reconsideration by DeWolfe v.
Richmond, 434 Md. 444, 456, 76 A.3d 1019, 1026 (2013)(hereinafter “DeWolfe II”)
(further holding that indigent defendants are entitled to counsel before a
commissioner).
148
DeWolfe II, 434 Md. at 456, 76 A.3d at 1026.
149
Steven Lash, Hearing: Judges, Not Commissioners, Would Set Bail on Work
Days, MD. DAILY RECORD, Jan. 6, 2014. (“Del. Joseph F. Vallario Jr., who chairs the
influential House Judiciary Committee, said Monday that he prefers the current
bifurcated system of a bail hearing and review. But he added he recognizes the
financial strain maintaining the two-tier system would have on the state’s coffers
following the high court’s decision in DeWolfe v. Richmond . . . Vallario, however,
said he remains deeply opposed to holding bail hearings by videoconference…. The
justice system must make ‘sure that a defendant has the ability to face a judge when
he is being detained,’ added the delegate, who also handles criminal defense work as
an attorney in private practice.”).
150
Colbert, supra note 9 at 1758–61.
151
Leckliter v. State, 75 Md. App. 143, 153, 540 A.2d 847, 852-53 (1988) (holding
that the process of jury separation was merely a housekeeping measure and the
defendant was not entitled to be present during that time and accordingly, not
entitled to counsel at that time).
146
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assistance of counsel” is the presence of the defendant. 152 The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel….
[A defendant] is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence…. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. 153
The defendant is presumed innocent, but because he is incarcerated, he
suffers from a deficiency of that presumption.154 He will be presented to the
court in an ill-fitting bright yellow jumpsuit. In the courtroom, he would be
able to have counsel next to him to humanize him. An attorney cannot stand
up next to the client when he is in the detention center. 155 The defendant
becomes a miniature character on a screen instead of a human being. 156
While the defendant is in a remote location, his lawyer cannot answer
questions, and, perhaps most importantly, she cannot hear any variances her
client has to the information provided by the Pretrial Services Representative
152

United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 497–98 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (defendant
had the right to be present during voir dire, and it was error, albeit harmless, to
exclude him from the process).
153
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88–89 (1976) (citing Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). See also Hillman, supra note 136, at 63 (“One can
scarcely imagine a more ineffective situation regarding counsel-client private matters
than when the defendant and counsel are in different locations. The defendant relies
upon his or her attorney to offer sound advice and to argue their case as effectively
as possible. When a defendant is separated from his or her attorney, the situation
changes dramatically. The reliance and trust created during the attorney client
relationship may become suspended by the technology. If . . . the situation serves to
‘chill’ communications, the attorney may not be able to adequately argue on behalf
of his or her client, thus rendering the defendant’s situation less fair and just.”).
154
Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth
Amendment's Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 50 (2005) (“There is a strong
correlation between pretrial detainment and conviction.”). See also BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 16, tbl. 13
(Dec. 2000), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc00.pdf.
155
Anne Bowen Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The
Remote Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1130 (2004) (“The defense attorney
cannot provide the kind of support that positioning in the courtroom offers, such as
standing up with and next to the client when the client stands”). See also Hillman,
supra note 136 (“One public defender summed up the situation succinctly: ‘An
attorney can’t be two places at once; we don’t want to leave the client alone.’”).
156
See supra Part IV (for a discussion of the psychological impact of video
communication and the dehumanizing effects of CCTV on the accused).
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or the Assistant State’s Attorney. 157 The attorney renders assistance at bail
review hearings by listening to her client’s input and forming proffers and
arguments based on the information he provides. Counsel may be familiar
with the case and the anticipated arguments at the hearing, but the client
frequently has firsthand information about the nuances of the information the
judge is to consider, such as his “family ties, employment status and history,
financial resources, . . . length of residence in the community, and length of
residence in [the s]tate.” 158 Even if the attorney is able to consult with the
defendant in person prior to the hearing, the advocate will not know the
Pretrial Services representative’s or the State’s recommendation until
moments before the hearing, or, more likely, during the hearing itself.
District court judges in Baltimore City weigh the factors in determining a
defendant’s likelihood of returning to trial and his risk to public safety. One
district court judge likened the situation to a “crystal ball,” noting that “you
can never know if a defendant will make bail, if in fact they will return to
trial, or be a risk to the community.” 159 This judge continued, “It is about
balancing these factors and an attorney standing next to the defendant will
not change the information that is provided.” 160
The issue we face is not whether counsel can “change” the information
that is provided, but whether counsel can render effective assistance by
eliciting helpful and relevant information from the client and contextualizing
the facts in light of applicable law. CCTV in bail review hearings denies
communication between the accused and his attorney. The affirmative act of
administering CCTV hearings is a form of governmental interference directly
related to the denial of counsel. Therefore, the principle established in
157

The Baltimore defendant would be located at the Central Booking at 300 E.
Madison Street, which is 1.7 miles from the Eastside District Court, 5.3 miles from
the John R. Hargrove, Sr. District Court, or 8.8 miles from the Borgerding District
Court. In light of the proximity from the court to the holding facility, no argument
can be made that videoconferencing eases the burden of transporting inmates over
long distances. See Poulin, supra note 155, at 1162 (“Courts may employ
videoconferencing even when it seems unnecessary. In some jurisdictions where the
detention facility is close to the court, the court nevertheless employs
videoconferencing.”) (footnote omitted). But see Michael D. Roth, Laissez-Faire
Videoconferencing: Remote Witness Testimony and Adversarial Truth, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 185, 190-191 (2000) (“A notable example of how remote appearances can save
time and money was the arraignment in New Jersey federal court of the alleged
Unabomber on charges of, inter alia, first-degree murder. ‘The problem was that
Theodore J. Kaczynski was being held in Sacramento, California. Estimated costs of
transporting the defendant were $30,000. Using [videoconferencing] the court
conducted the arraignment at a cost of about $45.00’”) (footnotes omitted).
158
Md. R. § 4-216.
159
Interview with the Honorable Judge John R. Hargrove, District Court of
Maryland for Baltimore City, June 13, 2013.
160
Interview with the Honorable Judge John R. Hargrove, District Court of
Maryland for Baltimore City, June 13, 2013 (emphasis added).
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Strickland does not apply when analyzing the defendant’s denial of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in the context of videoconference bail review.161
The central issue becomes whether the State shall be permitted to interfere
with and restrain the accused’s right to assistance of counsel.
In Geders v. United States, the Supreme Court distinguised governmental
interference with the right to counsel from counsel's failure to provide
effective assistance. 162 The Court held that the “[g]overnment violates the
right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability
of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the
defense.” 163 Analogous to Geders, CCTV displaces the attorney and his
client from the traditional seating arrangement 164 where the two have the
opportunity to converse privately, prior to, during, and after the hearing.
Counsel’s inability to represent his client effectively is due to the inherent
flaws of a system that was created for the convenience of the government.
The promise of Gideon is empty when the defendant is removed from his
own bail review hearing. 165
161

The Strickland Court held that “the benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
162
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (holding that a trial judge’s order
preventing defendant from consulting his counsel during a seventeen hour overnight
recess between his direct and crossexamination deprived defendant of his right to
assistance of counsel and was invalid).
163
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989), (citing Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976)).
164
CCTV allows the defendant to remain in Central Booking where he will be seated
amongst other detainees. Collectively, their image is transmitted through a video
camera to the judge’s courtroom. The judge’s image is simultaneously transmitted to
a TV screen where the accused can see him seated. The attorney has the choice to
either remain in Central Booking, where the client is located, or to travel to the
courthouse and physically represent her clients’ cases before the judge. The latter
clearly disconnects the two parties by miles. It may seem as if the attorney will be
able to communicate with her client if she remains in Central Booking, but her client
remains seated amongst others awaiting bail review and she is kept several feet
away. The traditional seating arrangement is one in which the attorney and client are
seated next to each other, at the same table, and the two are capable of having a
private exchange as the hearing progresses. Simply by preventing the attorney and
his client from having any communication, CCTV does not sustain the traditional
role attorneys are intended to carry out when representing a client.
165
See Gideon, 372 U.S. 335. See also Juliana B. Humphrey, The Folly of Video
Courts, INDIGENT DEF. (NLADA, Washington D.C., Md.) Sept–Oct. 1998, V.2 No.
4. (“The NLADA Board of Directors in March 1990 resolved that the Association
‘strongly’ opposed the employment of [CCTV] for criminal arraignments because of
the adverse impact on the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel.”).
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Data demonstrates that representation by counsel positively impacts the
outcome of the accused’s bail review hearing, so the denial of counsel is a
significant factor. 166 With CCTV bail reviews, attorneys have to choose
whether to remain in the jail with their client during the hearing or to travel
to the courthouse to be in the same room as the judge. Judge Cooper’s
experience is that representation is hindered if the attorney is not present in
the courtroom, but he acknowledges the time constraints attorneys face,
stating, “I would rather have the attorney remain with the client so he does
not sacrifice important information-gathering time.” 167
Proponents of CCTV bail review hearings would suggest that the system
operates fairly when the attorney remains at Central Booking with her client.
However, there is a lack of consistent training and oversight of correctional
officers who organize detainees for the CCTV hearings within Central
Booking’s videoconference room. 168 By contrast, bailiffs of the court are
accustomed to the decorum of courtroom proceedings, and the presiding
judge is able to instruct them at any time. When the courtroom is extended
to the secured facility through videoconference technology, the judge is not
privy to the hostile, demeaning, and potentially unconstitutional conduct of
the correctional officers. 169
During one observed instance of CCTV bail review, a correctional officer
denied a public defender’s request to speak with one of her clients in Central
Booking before the videoconference system was activated and before the
judge was seated at the bench. The judge was unaware of the controversy.
The public defender, Megan Lewis, did not relent, and called for another
correctional officer to intervene. Ms. Lewis and her client were eventually
166

Colbert, supra note 9; THE ABELL FOUND., supra note 9 (Defendants represented
by counsel were “two and one-half times more likely to be released on their own
recognizance . . . [t]he bail review judge reduced the bail amount for one out of
every two [represented defendants], but only one out of every seven” who were
unrepresented).
167
Interview with the Honorable Judge Robert Cooper, District Court of Maryland
for Baltimore City, June 12, 2013.
168
See, e.g., Ian Duncan et al., Inside Jail Run From Within, THE BALT. SUN (Apr.
28, 2013), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-black-guerrilla-familytavon-white-prison-corruption-20130425,0,7483161.html; Roger Baysden, Fix City
Jail by Tearing Up Officers’ ‘Bill of Rights’, THE BALT. SUN (May 21, 2013),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-21/news/bs-ed-city-jail-letter20130521_1_maryland-voters-correctional-officers-bill-appeals-board;
Mismanagement and Failed Leadership Led to the Debacle at Baltimore’s Jail, THE
BALT. SUN (May 9, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-09/news/bs-edprison-scandal-20130509_1_prison-guards-prison-system-failed-leadership.
169
See NAT’L ASS’N PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10 (“The first
appearance before a judicial officer should take place in such physical surroundings
as are appropriate to the administration of justice” with commentary adding that the
first appearance should be “conducted with the dignity and decorum that a court
should convey.”).
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allowed to speak, but the two correctional officers hovered over their
conversation, failing to recognize attorney-client privilege. Correctional
officers maintain order within Central Booking—they are not charged with
the duty of protecting the defendants’ rights.
Blockades to communication are commonplace. These disputes are not
always resolved in such a way that allows for the attorney to consult with her
client. Valuable preparation time is lost, and arguing with correctional
officers over basic client communication standards creates an unnecessary
distraction from the administration of justice. 170
Extending the courtroom to untrained personnel, outside of the judge’s
reach and view, has grave implications for the accused’s constitutional right
to access counsel. Whether intentional or unintentional, correctional officers
often deny attorneys the opportunity to meet privately and to communicate
with their client prior to, or during, a video bail docket. 171
ii. Attorneys Cannot Fulfill the Ethical Duties of Advising and
Advocating through a CCTV Proceeding
A lawyer has a duty to advise, 172 to communicate with, 173 and to advocate
for her client at all times during the course of the representation.174 A lawyer

170

“The right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments extends to pre-trial detainees.” Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 280 (D. Md. 1972) (citations omitted) (holding that
inadequate facilities in attorney-client visiting rooms constituted denial of effective
assistance of counsel when a pretrial detainee in city jail was prevented from
communicating with his attorney as a form of discipline). Collins can be analogized
to the method in which bail review hearings are currently conducted. The separation
of the attorney from his client during the hearing hampers the attorney’s ability to
confer with his client and to riposte statements made by Pretrial Services. If the
attorney is in the courthouse and the accused remains in Central Booking, CCTV
disconnects the attorney from his client. In the case of Baltimore City, there is no
alternative for the attorney and his client to confer during the bail review hearing, in
private, without breaking privilege. Attorneys are not provided with a secured phone
or fax line in which they can privately confer or share documents with their clients
during the hearing. See also Jack Rubin, Central Booking and Jails are Failing, THE
BALT. SUN, Aug. 7, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-08-07/news/bs-edjail-letter-20120807_1_deplorable-conditions-baltimore-city-detention-centerinterviews.
171
This has been the experience of the Authors.
172
Md. R. 16-812 (2005) (also codified and set forth in Appendix as MD. LAWYERS’
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2005)) (hereinafter “MLRPC”). See also Ideals
of Professionalism, MARYLAND PROFESSIONAL CENTER, INC.,
http://www.marylandprofessionalism.org/images/pdf/2216633.pdf (last visited Sept.
16, 2014) (“[Lawyers should] keep a client apprised of the status of important
matters affecting the client and inform the client of the frequency with which
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cannot effectively communicate with her client over a closed circuit
television system, as the defendant will not be able to confer in
confidence. 175 All exchanges will be audible to the judge, the prosecution,
the members of the public in the courtroom, and other inmates and jail
personnel located in the room from where the defendant’s images are being
projected. Communications that would be privileged if the defendant were
present become very public. All the defendant’s statements will be recorded,
and could be used against him. 176
Specifically, the defendant, over CCTV, will not be able to benefit from
counsel’s advice about decorum. 177 The defendant may want to interject
facts or arguments, and counsel will not, over video, be able to discretely
information will be provided, understanding that some matters will require regular
contact . . . .”).
173
See the MLRPC, supra note 172, R. 2.1. See also Preamble to MLRPC, supra
note 172 (“[A]s advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications.”).
174
See Preamble to MLRPC, supra note 172 (“[A]s advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.”).
175
Hillman, supra note 136, at 63 (“Furthermore, even if the defendant and counsel
can speak over a private line, counsel will suffer from the same problems that a
judge may encounter when video teleconference is used, i.e., the inability to detect
non[]verbal [sic] cues and the problems caused by the camera-video setup. . . .
[E]ven if privileged communications can be provided, the relationship and
conversation between attorney and defendant may be chilled. This will contribute to
a lower threshold of advice and communication which weighs unfairly against the
defendant.”) (footnotes omitted).
176
Fenner v. State, 381 Md. 1, 27, 846 A.2d 1020, 1034 (2004) (holding that the trial
court’s admission of defendant’s statements, made in response to the judge’s
question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir[,]” while
defendant was not represented by counsel at an initial appearance, did not violate the
Fifth or Sixth Amendments); Schmidt v. State, 60 Md. App. 86, 101, 481 A.2d 241,
248-49 (1984) (upholding trial court’s admission of a defendant’s statement made at
a bail review); Cowards v. Georgia, 465 S.E.2d 677, 679, (Ga. 1996) (holding that
defendant’s statements made at bail review were properly admitted in trial); United
States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237-39 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming a trial court’s
admission of statements a defendant made during a “harangue” at his bail review);
United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir. 1981) (affirming a trial
court’s admission of exculpatory statements a defendant made while unrepresented
at a bail hearing, and remarking that “factors pertinent to the granting of bail, such as
‘the nature and circumstances of the offense charged’ and ‘the weight of the
evidence against the accused,’ see 18 U.S.C. § 3146, may inspire an accused to try to
show, unadvisedly, that matters were different from what the government portrays,
getting him into hot water as a result”). See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501,
523–24 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing attorney-client privilege and the waiver of that
privilege when the defendant knows his telephone discussion with his lawyer is
being recorded).
177
See Poulin, supra note 155 at 1129–30.
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advise him about the propriety or benefit of doing so. 178 The defendant may
feel emotional over the arguments or outcome of the hearing, and may
express his disappointment in a way that reflects negatively on him. 179 One
of counsel’s tasks is to assist the defendant in presenting himself favorably;
however, over a video connection, counsel can be of no help to her client in
this task.
There is a clear deficiency within the system when an attorney cannot
communicate with her client in confidence, and present the information he
shares to the trier of fact. If the Public Defender Act mandates
representation at bail review hearings, that representation must comport with
the rules of ethics. 180
B. Right of Defendant to be Physically Present
The right to presence has deep roots in English common law, where
accused felons were traditionally denied the assistance of counsel. 181 Denial
of counsel gave a defendant’s right to presence “a position of even greater
importance.” 182 American courts did not adopt the English common law
provision, as the concept of denying the accused representation was thought
to be an “inherent irrationality of the English limitation.” 183 The Fourth
Circuit identified two prevalent rationales behind the defendant’s right to be
present:
(1) [A]ssuring nondisruptive defendants the opportunity to
observe—and . . . to understand—all stages of the trial not
involving purely legal matters generally incomprehensible to
the layman in order to prevent the loss of confidence in
178

Id. at 1130.
“The risk, of course, is that if the defendant displays inappropriate behavior—any
conduct not within the norm for the court—the court will evaluate the defendant
negatively. That negative evaluation can precipitate specific negative findings (that
the defendant poses a risk to herself or others) or simply prompt the court to exercise
discretion against the defendant.” Id. “[I]f the defendant feels compelled to respond
to the prosecution’s allegations, but counsel believes it would be imprudent for the
defendant to address the court, the physical separation between defendant and
counsel will make it more difficult for counsel to calm and silence the defendant.”
Id. at 1148 (footnotes omitted).
180
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-209 (West 2008) (“Communications
between an indigent individual and an individual in the Office or engaged by the
Public Defender are protected by the attorney-client privilege to the same extent as
though an attorney had been privately engaged.”).
181
United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1257 (4th Cir. 1974), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2000).
182
Id. at 1258–59.
183
Id. (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306 (1973)).
179
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courts as instruments of justice . . . [and] (2) protecting the
integrity and reliability of the trial mechanism by
guaranteeing the defendant the opportunity to aid in his
defense. 184
These rationales establish a framework for a fair and just trial, and the
reasoning equally applies to physical presence in bail review hearings. 185
Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 43”) governs
when a defendant is required to be present in federal proceedings. 186 The
Fifth Circuit analyzed the plain meaning and context of Rule 43, concluding
that “Rule 43(a) requires a defendant’s ‘presence’ . . . at all stages of trial.
The rights protected by Rule 43 include the defendant’s constitutional
Confrontation Clause and Due Process rights, and the common law right to
be present.” 187
The law has developed such that the right for the accused to be physically
present at a pretrial proceeding is intertwined with his right to counsel. The
Maryland Rules also explicitly require that the “[p]ublic [d]efender shall
provide representation to an eligible defendant at the initial appearance[,]”188

184

Gregorio, 497 F.2d at 1258–59.
“Because many of the defendants at first appearance proceedings are
likely to be in an anxious, confused, or physically or mentally unwell state
(especially if they have been abusing drugs or alcohol, or have been
involved in a physical altercation), it is especially important for the judicial
officers and others who interact with them to make sure that they
understand what is happening.” See NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV.
AGENCIES, supra note 10, (commentary to Standard 2.2(c)): “At any
pretrial detention hearing, defendants should have the right to: (i) be present
. . . .”).
186
See United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2001) (defendant had right
to be present during sentencing, physically, not by CCTV, despite the fact that he
had acted aggressively during court proceedings in the past). See also United States
v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (sentencing ought not take place unless the
defendant is physically present, and the meaning of the word presence as used in
Rule 43 is not satisfied by videoconference); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d
489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (where the trial judge conducted a portion of voir dire at the
bench, out of the defendant's hearing, defendant's exclusion from a portion of voir
dire was harmless error; however, the court noted that a defendant's right to be
present in order to assist counsel applied during voir dire).
187
Navarro, 169 F.3d at 236.
188
Md. R. 4-216(e)(2) (“Duty of Public Defender. Unless another attorney has
entered an appearance or the defendant has waived the right to counsel for purposes
of an initial appearance before a judge in accordance with this section, the Public
Defender shall provide representation to an eligible defendant at the initial
appearance.”).
185
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and that the judge shall advise the defendant of that right. 189 In Rothgery v.
Gillespie County, the appellant, originally unrepresented, was arrested and
charged with being a felon in possession of a gun, despite the fact that he had
no prior criminal history. 190 The court held the accused’s right to counsel
attached at his initial appearance, and that states cannot unreasonably delay
assigning representation to indigent defendants. 191
In United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court of the Untied States
construed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to apply to critical stages 192
of the proceeding. 193 While the Court has not explicitly held that a bail
review hearing is a critical stage, counsel’s representation is eviscerated
without his client.194 The accused is the center of the defense; for it is his
experiences, his memories, and his life that are being discussed. The hearing
is a fluid process where information is conveyed quickly, and an attorney
needs continuous input from his client. 195 When counsel’s representation is
required, together both he and the defendant must stand together before the
court. When counsel is not present, a defendant’s belief that he has no input
in his own trial amplifies:
Criminal defendants, especially minorities, often feel they
are “outsiders” rather than participants in the adjudication of
justice. [They] may already distrust and feel intimidated by
the criminal justice system, [and] CC[TV]provide[s] another
bar to their full understanding of the proceedings and
reinforce[s] their distrust of the system. CC[TV] only further
magnif[ies] this distrust and alienation. 196

189

Md. R.4-216(e)(3)(A)(i) (stating that the judge at a bail review hearing shall
advise the defendant that he has a right to an attorney at that proceeding).
190
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
191
Id. at 213.
192
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding a post indictment lineup in
the absence of counsel was a violation of the Sixth Amendment, in which counsel
would remove any taint of unfairness), abrogated by Wood v. State, 196 Md. App.
146, 7 A.3d 1115 (2010).
193
“As early as Powell v. State of Alabama, supra we recognized that the period
from arraignment to trial was ‘perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings,’
during which the accused ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel’ if the guarantee is
not to prove an empty right.” Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 54 (1932) (citations omitted)).
194
See infra Part V.C.ii.
195
Colbert, supra note 9 (“The [bail review] hearing took slightly more time when
an attorney was present: on average, two minutes and thirty-seven seconds, versus
one minute, forty-seven seconds without counsel.”).
196
See Thaxton, supra note 20, at 197–98 (footnotes omitted).
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While the Constitution does not guarantee the defendant a right to be
confident in his proceedings, 197 the defendant’s inability to comprehend the
bail review process is further strained by videoconference hearings. The
removal of safeguards, such as the right to counsel, furthers a defendant’s
distrust in the process. 198 A familiar admonishment to the defendant is,
“[d]on’t speak because what you say is being recorded and will be used
against you.” This is good advice under the circumstances; the defendant is
miles away from his counsel, and his words, if audible at all, will be heard by
the judge and made part of the court record. 199 The public defender collects
extensive information from her client. Pretrial Service’s proffer is not
disclosed in advance of the CCTV hearing, however, so counsel is unable to
communicate its contents to her client or to prepare a response to that proffer
ahead of time. For this reason, the attorney should be within a whisper’s
distance during the hearing. 200
A fair and just trial is kindled by an initial confidence vested in the
pretrial stage. 201 The use of technology must be restrained to ensure fairness
197

United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1995).
See Thaxton, supra note 20, at 198 (“Keeping a defendant in her jail cell while
her attorney is in the courtroom perpetuates a defendant’s distrust of her attorney.”).
199
See Fenner v. State, 381 Md. 1, 27, 846 A.2d 1020, 1034 (2004) (holding that the
trial court’s admission of defendant’s statements, made in response to the judge’s
question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir[,]” while
defendant was not represented by counsel at an initial appearance, did not violate the
Fifth or Sixth Amendments); Schmidt v. State, 60 Md. App. 86, 101, 481 A.2d 241,
248-49 (1984) (upholding trial court’s admission of a defendant’s statement made at
a bail review); Cowards v. Georgia, 465 S.E.2d 677, 679, (Ga. 1996) (holding that
defendant’s statements made at bail review were properly admitted in trial); United
States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237-39 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming a trial court’s
admission of statements a defendant made during a “harangue” at his bail review);
United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir. 1981) (affirming a trial
court’s admission of exculpatory statements a defendant made while unrepresented
at a bail hearing, and remarking that “factors pertinent to the granting of bail, such as
‘the nature and circumstances of the offense charged’ and ‘the weight of the
evidence against the accused,’ see 18 U.S.C. § 3146, may inspire an accused to try to
show, unadvisedly, that matters were different from what the government portrays,
getting him into hot water as a result”). See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501,
523–24 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing attorney-client privilege and the waiver of that
privilege when the defendant knows his telephone discussion with his lawyer is
being recorded).
200
The language of Rule 43 of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure demonstrates,
implicitly, that initial physical presence must be required where the rules
affirmatively indicate that a waiver of presence can be made. United States v.
Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351
(1970) (trial judges should allow attorney-client communication when defendant is
excluded).
201
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
198
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for the accused. 202 The right of the accused to be physically present before a
judicial officer is deeply rooted in our system of fostering fair and just trials
for all who face the possibility of incarceration. 203
Character evidence is a form of propensity evidence that is not permitted
during trial in order to prevent the jury from forming inferences of guilt
against the accused. 204 Bail review is the only time during the accused’s
proceeding that his character and prior bad acts are discussed substantively.
At bail review, the accused’s character is directly at issue, and his absence
from the hearing prevents any opportunity to rebut representations made to
the court. 205 A defendant suffers a severe indignity by being subjected to a
discussion about his past acts while he bears the scrutiny silently.
Maryland’s bail review hearings have adversarial components that cannot
be avoided simply by labeling Pretrial Services a “neutral party.” The
charges presented against the accused contain evidence from the arresting
police officer. A police officer is not a neutral party, as his duty is to ferret
out crime. All too often, arresting officers have a motive to embellish on
factual information to support an arrest. 206 Law enforcement agents’
202

Adding an insightful analogy to our understanding of presence and the intention
of the legislature, Justice Widener observes: “The problem presented here is at least
as old as the trial of Walter Raleigh, who begged the court in vain to bring Lord
Cobham from the Tower. Sending the televised image of a witness from Butner to
the City of Raleigh is no different than sending Cobham's writings from the Tower to
Winchester.” Baker, 45 F.3d at 850-51 (Widener, J., dissenting). The case of Sir
Walter Raleigh is more prevalent than ever as it reminds parties within the criminal
justice system why formalities such as physical appearance were deliberately created
and protected. Any substitute for physical presence cannot be as meaningful.
203
The Honorable Spottswood William Robinson III advocated for the defendant’s
right to physical presence during the bail review stage, stating: “The trial court is not
only the traditional but also the superior tribunal for the kind of information
gathering which a sound foundation for a bail ruling almost inevitably requires. For
it is there that, at a hearing, the judge can come face-to-face with the primary
informational sources, and probe for what is obscure, trap what is elusive, and settle
what is controversial.” United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 581-82 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
204
Lester, supra note 154, at 35–36 (citations omitted) (“The rules of evidence
themselves prohibit the practice of using past actions to prove future actions. This
certainly should not be a guiding principle when the future action has not and may
never even occur. A presumption of guilt accompanies a defendant instead of a
presumption of innocence. The presumption of guilt is not only for the charged
crime but also for future crimes.”).
205
Id. at 35 (“Basing future actions on mere allegations of prior indiscretions
necessarily requires a substantive discussion regarding the validity of the alleged
crime. To have such a discussion at a point when discovery is minimal, and the
availability of important witnesses is not required, places the defendant at a severe
information disadvantage.”).
206
See generally supra note 40.
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representations are given great weight at bail review hearings, and go largely
unchallenged because the defense has not been provided with discovery. 207
The accused’s presence is not only intertwined with his access to effective
counsel, but also with his ability to challenge the probable cause
determination by means of the Confrontation Clause. 208
C. Violation of Confrontation Clause
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Confrontation
Clause, with certain exceptions, to guarantee defendants a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.209 CCTV violates a
defendant’s right to confrontation during a sentencing. 210 The term “present”
under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure means that, for the
purposes of sentencing, a defendant must be at the same location as the
judge. 211
207

“Basing future actions on mere allegations of prior indiscretions necessarily
requires a substantive discussion regarding the validity of the alleged crime. To
have such a discussion at a point when discovery is minimal, and the availability of
important witnesses is not required, places the defendant at a severe information
disadvantage.” Lester, supra note 154, at 35.
208
A discussion of how CCTV violates the Confrontation Clause is included in a
later section. See infra Part V.C.
209
Maryland v. Craig and Coy v. Iowa are relevant to the interpretation of the right
of confrontation in the context of videoconferences in which a witness was given
dispensation from personal appearance in court. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
862 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1012 (1988) (holding that under the
Confrontation Clause, witnesses can not appear in trial by video unless case-specific
findings are made as to why the witness can not be physically present). In both, the
child witness was given a pass on coming face-to-face with a defendant. The interest
in protecting the complaining witness, due to precise findings of vulnerability,
outweighed, in the Court’s reasoning, the defendant’s right to confront his accusers.
In response to the Court’s decision in Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia wrote a
strong-worded dissent, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined.
The four-justice opinion criticized the majority opinion that sanctioned Maryland’s
procedure of allowing an alleged child victim of sexual abuse to testify in trial via
CCTV. Justice Scalia wrote, “the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable
evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable
evidence, undeniably among which was ‘face-to-face’ confrontation.” Craig, 497
U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
210
United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236–37 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Craig, 497
U.S. at 849). In Navarro, the court held that sentencing by videoconference between
judge and defendant violated rule requiring defendant's presence at sentencing. Id.
Presence was interpreted to describe the defendant’s physical presence in court. Id.
211
Navarro, 169 F.3d at 236-37 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118
(1994)). See supra Part IV.A (detailing the argument regarding the interpretation of
“presence.”).
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The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee the defendant absolute
protection in a criminal trial, but it has some application to pretrial hearings,
however limited, on a case-by-case basis. 212 In order to determine whether
the Confrontation Clause is germane to claims arising from pretrial hearings,
lower courts have considered: whether the pretrial hearing is adversarial,
whether excluding the defendant from the hearing interferes with his
opportunity to challenge evidence presented against him, and whether the
pre-trial proceeding is considered a critical stage. 213 To establish the
necessity for the Confrontation Clause’s safeguard in bail review hearings
conducted through CCTV, this section will apply the various factors
identified by lower courts.
i. Pretrial Services Present Adverse Evidence Against the Accused
The Pretrial Services’ representatives should present unbiased
background information and provide an objective bail recommendation. 214
212

As Scalia explained, the right of confrontation explicitly provides for "face-toface" confrontation, but also guaranteed are “implied and collateral rights such as
cross-examination, oath, and observation of demeanor. These are the specific trial
procedures and ‘the purpose of this entire cluster of rights is to ensure the reliability
of evidence.’” Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213
The right of a defendant to be present as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment is triggered “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably
substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). “Rather than analyzing how the right to confrontation
applies to pretrial proceedings, the Court instead decided ‘it is more useful to
consider whether excluding the defendant from the hearing interferes with his
opportunity for effective cross-examination,’ and they found that it did not.”
Christine Holst, The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process
Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2010) (the author analyzes various
interpretations of precedent by lower courts to determine whether the Confrontation
Clause applies to pretrial hearings) (citations omitted).
214
See Barry Mahoney Et Al., Pretrial Services Programs: Responsibilities and
Potential, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE ISSUES AND PRACTICES, 31-32 (2001),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181939.pdf.
Subjective risk assessments are based on program staff members’
consideration of the relative weight to be given to different factors.
Objective risk assessments use instruments such as point scales or
pretrial release guidelines that assign weights to variables such as
nature and seriousness of the current charge, seriousness of prior
record, employment status, housing situation, family ties, and the
existence and nature of mental health or substance abuse problems.
. . . All three principal sets of national standards in the pretrial
release field favor the use of objective criteria, principally on the
grounds that they are fairer and more consistent.
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The Pretrial Services representative provides information to the court about
the alleged crime and the defendant’s life circumstances including
employment, education, and residential details. The representative lists any
prior occasions during which a presiding judge issued a “failure to appear”
warrant for a defendant. The record of a failure to appear will be provided
to the court regardless of the defendant’s reason for not being present in
court. To a first time bystander, Pretrial Services’ role may seem
indistinguishable from that of the State’s Attorney, an adversarial party. 215
The judge gives great weight to Pretrial Services assessment of the accused’s
likelihood to appear for trial and the risk he poses to public safety.
The Confrontation Clause is sometimes thought to apply only during
hearings under oath. Putting adverse witnesses under oath is a protection
afforded to the defendant. The oath is a safeguard against unfettered,
dishonest testimony without repercussions. Historically, it is made to God,
and designed to evoke the scruples in a witness, as his lie would provoke an
eternal consequence. 216
Allowing extensive proffers while maintaining that the Confrontation
Clause does not apply in the absence of an oath is an unfortunate
misinterpretation of the purpose and meaning of the oath. In his dissent in
Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia made clear that the oath was not a
prerequisite to the right of confrontation, but an additional safeguard against
false accusation, along with the right of cross-examination: “If unconfronted
testimony is admissible hearsay when the witness is unable to confront the
defendant, then presumably there are other categories of admissible hearsay
consisting of unsworn testimony when the witness is unable to risk perjury,
un-cross-examined testimony when the witness is unable to undergo hostile
questioning, etc.” 217
Crawford v. Washington established that the Confrontation Clause applies
to all statements that are testimonial or made with an expectation that they
are to be used in court. 218 Certainly, the statements Pretrial Services delivers
during bail review hearings are testimonial, and absence of the oath does not
change that fact. Therefore, the defendant should be afforded the right to be
present in court to confront the Pretrial Services representative.
Shortly after the time of arrest, a commissioner determines probable cause
by reviewing the arresting officer’s statement of charges. Pretrial Services
then furnishes the commissioner with a report, which will be considered at
the defendant’s initial appearance. Additionally, the report contains
Id.
215

This has been the experience of the Authors.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217
Id. at 866.
218
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-53 (2004) (holding unanimously that
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applies equally to both in-court
testimony and out-of-court statements).
216
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information gathered during an interview of the accused by a Pretrial
Services representative. If a subsequent request for a bail review is filed in
circuit court, the information that was initially gathered pursuant to the
interview is used again by Pretrial Services, and the accused will not be
interviewed again. Counsel may provide updated information prior to the
hearing; ultimately, however, the Pretrial Services representative will make
extensive representations to the court regarding what family members said or
left out. 219 The Pretrial Services representative is not under oath and will not
be subject to cross-examination by counsel. 220
At a bail review hearing, the Pretrial Services representative will provide
information, as an officer of the court, about the defendant. Pretrial Services
will use the charging document to make recommendations of bail, or denial
of bail. The defendant has a right under the Confrontation Clause to confront
the witnesses against him, and virtual confrontation is not sufficient.
Allowing unsworn, un-cross-examined testimony during a bail review
hearing, when the defendant’s liberty interest is at stake, withers the rights of
a defendant facing criminal charges.
ii. Excluding the Defendant from a Bail Review Hearing Interferes
with his Opportunity for Effective Confrontation
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him....” The Supreme Court of the
United States has made clear that it “is the accused, not counsel, who must
be ‘confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .’” 221 During a CCTV bail
review hearing in circuit court, the accused may hear the statements made by
Pretrial Services over the video feed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the
defendant a right to confront, not to listen. Though the accused may be in
the same room as the Pretrial Services representative during a CCTV bail
review hearing in district court, he is unable to directly provide information
to his attorney in confidence as Pretrial Services states its findings. In both
scenarios, the defendant is stifled by the inability to contest inaccurate
statements.
By making representations to the court about the defendant’s criminal
history, perceived risk of flight, and dangerousness to society, 222 the
219

See generally, NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 5960.
220
Id. at 13.
221
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment grants the defendant the right to make his own defense).
222
Md. R. 4-216(f)(1) (Maryland Rules provide a detailed list of “factors” to be
considered at a bail review. In Baltimore City, an Assistant State’s Attorney and an
agent from the Pretrial Services Division of the Department of Public Safety
provides extensive information.). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2008).
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prosecutor and Pretrial Services’ representative essentially become witnesses
against the defendant. 223 The defendant is neither able to confront the
prosecutor, nor the representative during a video conference bail hearing.
D. Violation of Right to Due Process of Law
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of
his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with
force against him, or send others to do so, except by the
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. 224
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court established a three prong balancing test
to determine those “procedural safeguards due a person whose interests are
to be adversely affected by government actions.” 225 Courts should consider
the following factors:
(1) The private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
(3) the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirements would
entail. 226
The Due Process Clause is used as a prism to reveal the rights guaranteed
to a criminal defendant in protection of his liberty. Thus, the issue that
CCTV generates is one of constitutional dimension: Whether the defendant’s

223

See Poulin, supra note 1555, at 1148 (noting that “the prosecution and defense
may present conflicting information” at a bail review hearing, and “[i]f the defendant
is not in court, the defendant will be hampered . . . in assisting counsel to change the
facts presented”). See also Thaxton, supra note 20, at 188 (“[B]y making
representations to the court as to the defendant's criminal history, perceived risk of
flight, and dangerousness to society, the prosecutor becomes a witness that the
defendant is unable to confront due to the use of [CCTV].”).
224
MAGNA CARTA, Cl. 39 (1215), referenced in, A.E. DICK HOWARD, TEXT AND
COMMENTARY, MAGNA CARTA (1964).
225
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff
satisfied the first prong of its test, acknowledging that the receipt of benefits was an
important private interest—plaintiff accused the federal government of terminating
his Social Security disability benefits without an evidentiary hearing prior to
termination).
226
Id.
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presence at the bail review hearing would reduce the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty?
i. Private Interests Affected by CCTV
The accused has an interest in liberty pending trial. It follows that he also
has an interest in a bail determination that is based upon a full and fair
portrayal of his character and ties to the community. 227 Meaningful
assistance of counsel is crucial to a fair hearing. The defendant’s ability to
obtain a fair bail determination is also dependent on the opportunity to
effectively confront the adverse evidence presented against him. 228
Presence allows for the procedural safeguards that are absent in CCTV
hearings. Because counsel cannot effectively advocate for his client if the
accused is not by his side, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be
fulfilled without the accused’s physical presence.
Counsel cannot
effectively advocate for his client if the accused is not by his side. As
discussed above, the right to counsel and defendant’s physical presence at
the hearing are interdependent. Baltimore City affords indigent defendants
the right to counsel during the bail review stage, but with CCTV, this right is
hollow.
The Maryland Legislature recognized the importance of
representation during this stage, which is why the right to counsel during the
bail review stage survived after DeWolfe I. 229 Moreover, the adversarial
components of bail review necessitate the guidance of counsel, and the
counselor’s need to obtain input from her client at any time during the bail
review hearing.
Individualized justice is lost at the bail review hearing when the accused
is physically removed from the courtroom. The presumption of innocence is
“the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” 230 Where is the
presumption of innocence when the accused is banished from the courthouse

227

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“If
excessive bail is imposed the defendant stays in jail.”).
228
In Maryland, the preliminary hearing, which is controlled by Maryland Rule 4221, generally occurs before a district court judge. This hearing is a “critical stage”
of the criminal process, within the meaning of Coleman v. Alabama, to determine
whether there is probable cause to require the defendant to stand trial on the charges.
399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970). See also Green v. State, 286 Md. 692, 695, 410 A.2d 234,
235 (1980); Hebron v. State, 13 Md. App. 134, 151 n.2, 281 A.2d 547, 556 n.2
(1971).
229
Public Defender Act, MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2)(i).
230
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 763 (citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895)).
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and is depicted in a jail surrounding? 231 Video bail dehumanizes an
individual who is presumed innocent. 232
The defendant’s interest in liberty triggers a due process
analysis. Unfavorable bail determinations lead to the deprivation of liberty.
When a video bail hearing’s removal of necessary procedural safeguards,
revolving around physical presence, is the cause of an individual’s
deprivation of liberty, that deprivation is erroneous. The accused is not
afforded his right to counsel when he is removed from counsel’s side. He is
denied his right to confront adverse evidence and witnesses when he is
absent from the courtroom, where the information is being conveyed to the
judge. He loses his presumption of innocence when he is depicted, not only
in prison garb, but inside the jail. 233 Without presence, the accused is not
afforded his full spectrum of rights.
ii. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Liberty
The second prong of the Eldridge test assesses the risk of the possibility
that a person will be mistakenly deprived of their private interests because of
the lack of additional or different procedural safeguards. 234 Generally, if the
231

“It is clear that the presumption of innocence must be maintained in the eyes of a
jury. But a judicial officer is just as susceptible to bias as a juror. A judicial officer
may be more vulnerable to the risk of implied bias based on the mere status of the
defendant. A juror may only hear a handful of cases, but a judicial officer will hear
thousands.” Lester, supra note 154, at 9–10 (citations omitted). See also John
Tierney, Do You Suffer from Decision Fatigue?, N.Y. TIMES: MAGAZINE (Aug. 17,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decisionfatigue.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=willpower&st=cse&.
232
Lester, supra note 154, at 6 (“For the presumption to have its full meaning, it
must apply at all stages of the judicial process.”). See generally Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution, made applicable to the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, requires counsel to be present when requested by
the defendant during all critical stages of the proceedings, including, but not limited
to, pretrial interrogations).
233
See generally Lester, supra note 154, at 54 (explaining how the courts must
consider the defendant’s due process rights in all stages of the criminal proceedings,
including bail review hearings).
234
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court ruled that the administrative procedures in
place did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights. The plaintiff was offered
several methods to address the termination of benefits, but did not choose to employ
them. 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976). However, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that
the governmental interest in conserving administrative costs were not sufficient to
override public aid recipients’ interest in procedural due process, even though the
procedures did not permit recipients to present evidence, be heard in person or
through counsel, or to confront adverse witnesses. 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970). The
Eldridge Court distinguished Goldberg, saying the crucial factor in Goldberg was
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risk of error is minimal, the need for additional procedures diminish. In the
alternative, if the risk is high, then additional procedures would be merited.
Videoconference systems disproportionately affect indigent defendants,
and there has been no significant effort made by the state to address or
remedy the disparate impact. As discussed above, jails are filled with
individuals deep in poverty. 235 Indigent individuals accused of a crime
should be situated in a manner similar to that of wealthy individuals accused
of the same crime; however, their outcomes differ substantially. Rarely does
an affluent individual remain in Central Booking long enough to have a bail
review hearing; thus, CCTV disproportionately affects indigent defendants.
The CCTV images of detainees in a jail setting place a stigma against
indigent defendants, that their only identity is that of a criminal. Indigent
defendants often cannot afford the bail amounts set by commissioners, but
indigency alone does not make them deserving of a sub-par form of justice.
Each defendant’s demeanor is different, each judge’s perception varies,
and never has a video system’s transmission been ideal. The risk of error in
a video bail review hearing is not minimal. Where the defendant is
physically absent, there is a significant risk that the defendant’s liberty will
be erroneously deprived during a bail review hearing. To avoid the risk of
wrongfully depriving the accused of his liberty before being found guilty,
pretrial incarceration should be the last resort.
iii. Governmental Interests
The third prong of the Eldridge test scrutinizes the government’s
interests. 236 The Eldridge Court made clear that when the procedure at issue
was created to alleviate administrative burdens, then a court considers
whether the need for “enhanced due process” is merited by the need to assure
individuals that administrative actions are procedurally just. 237
Administrative costs should not be considered if enhanced due process is
merited. However, if the costs of the additional procedures outweigh the
benefits, then the government should not be required to use additional
resources.

that welfare recipients are in dire need and assistance is only given to persons on the
very margin of subsistence, whereas eligibility for social security disability is not
based on financial need. The Eldridge Court also recognized an additional factor
that adds dimension to its analysis:the fairness and reliability of existing procedures,
and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at
340. Goldberg held that access to financial aid that sustains ones ability to obtain
food and shelter are quintessential elements of human survival. Goldberg, 397 U.S.
at 364.
235
See generally Walsh supra note 9 and accompanying text.
236
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
237
Id. at 348.
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The administrative costs associated with conducting video bail review
hearings should not be given any weight. CCTV deprives the accused of
essential safeguards, which assist him in obtaining a favorable bail
determination. Enhanced due process (i.e., allowing a non-disruptive
defendant to be physically present) is required to eliminate the risk of
generating a disparate impact on the impoverished.
In United States v. Salerno, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of
the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 238 The Bail Reform Act requires “courts to
detain[,] prior to trial[,] arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if the
Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an
adversary hearing that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure… the
safety of any other person and the community.’” 239
Regarding the respondent’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Salerno Court
concluded, “Where Congress has mandated detention on the basis of some
other compelling interest—here, the public safety—the Eighth Amendment
does not require release on bail.” 240 Justice Rehnquist’s opinion reasons that
the Eighth Amendment “has never been thought to accord a right to bail in
all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases
where it is proper to grant bail.” 241
The respondent in Salerno argued that pretrial detention of the sort
contemplated in the Bail Reform Act required substantive due process;
however, the Court disagreed, holding that procedural due process was all
that was required. 242 The Court reasoned that the Bail Reform Act’s aim was
regulatory in nature, as it was designed to prevent crimes committed by those
released on bail, and not to punish those held in pretrial detention. 243
238

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
240
Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
241
Id. at 754 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952)).
242
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752. The respondent also unsuccessfully argued that The
Bail Reform Act violated the Eighth Amendment. The Salerno Court stated, “Where
Congress has mandated detention on the basis of some other compelling interest—
here, the public safety—the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.” Id.
at 740. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion reasoned that the Eighth Amendment “has never
been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail
shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.” Id. at 754
(quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952)).
243
Justice Rehnquist’s argument has been called into question, as Justice Marshall
points out: “The absurdity of this conclusion arises, of course, from the majority’s
cramped concept of substantive due process. The majority proceeds as though the
only substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause is a right to be free from
punishment before conviction. The majority's technique for infringing this right is
simple: merely redefine any measure which is claimed to be punishment as
‘regulation,’ and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its imposition.”
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also comments
on the majority’s logic in denying the claim to substantive due process on the
239
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The Court explained that a compelling governmental interest may
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest, stating, “[f]or example, in times of
war or insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the Government
may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous.” 244
Salerno set the benchmark for compelling governmental interests in the
context of bail review. 245 A reasonable inference can be made that the state’s
purported interests in replacing live bail review hearings with video
broadcasts include promoting administrative convenience, save
transportation costs and security fees, and reduce the danger of harms
associated with the transportation process. On the other hand, the
defendant’s liberty interest is fundamental, and not easily outweighed. 246
Maryland Rule 4-231(b) mandates that a “defendant is entitled to be
physically present in person at a preliminary hearing and every stage of the
trial.” 247 In applying the Salerno standard, the exception carved out for
video bail in Rule 4-231(d) deprives defendants of procedural safeguards. 248
The government’s interest in conducting CCTV bail hearings is neither
compelling nor narrowly tailored. The risk of erroneous deprivation of
liberty runs high when the accused is not present at his own hearing.
Presumably the state is interested in fostering efficiency. Efficiency is
generally met by harmonizing quantity and quality. However, the state is
employing procedures that focus on the quantity, not the quality of hearings.
Proponents of CCTV allege that videoconference systems are a step in the
right direction to meeting the Riverside standard. 249 However, the state’s
rationale for utilizing CCTV is not prompt presentment, but convenience and
brevity. CCTV bail hearings have not brought Baltimore City any closer to
grounds of an Eight Amendment violation for excessive bail, stating: “The Eighth
Amendment, as the majority notes, states that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.’
The majority then declares, as if it were undeniable, that: ‘This Clause, of course,
says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.’ If excessive bail is imposed
the defendant stays in jail. The same result is achieved if bail is denied altogether.
Whether the magistrate sets bail at $1 billion or refuses to set bail at all, the
consequences are indistinguishable.” Id. at 760–61 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Lester, supra note 154, at 32–33
(citations omitted) (“The Salerno majority did not dispute the premise that
punishment with less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt is unconstitutional; it
merely found that the detainment set forth pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142 was not
punishment, but a regulation. The Salerno court thus indirectly recognized this idea
when it characterized pretrial detention as regulatory rather than punitive since it
would be unconstitutional to punish with the limited proof offered at a pretrial
detention hearing.”).
244
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
245
Id. at 739.
246
Id. at 750.
247
Md. R. 4-231(b).
248
Md. R. 4-231(d).
249
See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
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satisfying the Riverside benchmark, requiring the initial appearance be held
within 48 hours of detention. 250
In United States v. Baker, the Fourth Circuit noted that “the goal of a
criminal proceeding is to uncover the truth by examining rigorously the
reliability of conflicting evidence presented and then engaging in extensive
fact-finding. The rights of cross-examination and confrontation, as well as
the right to effective assistance of counsel, are all directed toward this
goal.” 251 Quality is not produced by enhanced television resolution, but by
effective counsel and the right to confrontation. Quality is promoted by the
safeguards that prevent the government from turning an individualized
hearing into a dehumanizing, hurried cattle call. Due Process demands that
indigent defendants are present, in the flesh, at bail review hearings, as their
liberty interests outweigh the government’s interest in alleviating
administrative burdens.
CONCLUSION
Studies from the Cook County and Asylum hearings demonstrate the
consequences of videoconference bail review hearings for the accused.252 As
discussed above, the defendant’s presence is critical. Physical presence adds
integrity to the pretrial proceeding, and is the foundation upon which a
defendant’s constitutional rights, ensuring a fair and just trial, are based. If
the accused is not present, assistance of counsel cannot be effective and
confrontation is not possible. Judges making bail determinations should
consider that there are months, and potentially years, of pretrial incarceration
at stake for each defendant. 253 When making these important decisions that
so profoundly affect people’s lives, the accused’s humanity is a critical
factor. Their families, jobs, rental payments, health considerations, and
human need for freedom, comfort, and privacy are all relevant to a judge’s
250

See id.; Ian Duncan, Lost in Jail, Defendants Wait Weeks for Chance at Freedom,
THE BALT. SUN (Mar 16, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-0315/news/bs-md-forgotten-in-jail-20140315_1_brewer-defendants-prosecutors.
251
United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 844 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause
is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting
it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of
fact.”)).
252
See Seidman Diamond, supra note 91 at 898. See also Walsh & Walsh, supra
note 81, at 271.
253
Mason v. Cnty. of Cook, 488 F.Supp. 2d 761, 765 (2007) (denying the motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment and Due Process claims, remarking that bail “is
important to anyone charged with an offense—there are days, weeks, or even months
of incarceration at stake[—and i]f Plaintiff or others are denied bail because of
unconstitutional procedures, they may be entitled to the equitable relief they seek
here”).
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decision. By excluding an accused from his own bail hearing, his humanity
and dignity are forgotten, as he is out of sight and out of mind. Bail amounts
reflect the imbalance. The accusation and the defendant’s criminal history
should not be the only factors a judge considers in reaching a bail
determination. There is a person on the other side of the camera who
deserves to breathe the same air as the judge deciding his fate.
Videoconferencing affected Mr. Johnson’s outcome. Constitutional
safeguards, inherent in live bail review hearings, arguably made the
difference between Mr. Gibson receiving a favorable bail determination and
Mr. Johnson remaining incarcerated pending trial. The Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel and confrontation are intended to protect liberty, and are not
designed for the convenience of the state.
Pretrial incarceration has reached astronomical levels nationally.
Baltimore City, out of the twenty cities with the largest jails, locks up the
largest percentage of its population in the country. 254 Ninety percent of those
in the Baltimore jail complex are awaiting trial, and therefore are presumed
innocent until proven guilty. 255 Bail review hearings test the presumption of
innocence after Salerno and that presumption needs championing. 256
Videoconference bail review hearings are one brick in the wall around the
jail, which, according to recent data collection and scholarship by professors
from Northwestern University, result in 51% higher bail amounts than their
live counterparts. 257 Many jurisdictions face some form of automated
justice, which tends to dehumanize the accused. The trend towards the
integration of CCTV in criminal proceedings raises an important issue
concerning the proper balancing of judicial efficiency and a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights. This article seeks to give a voice to
indigent defendants who have become disproportionately subject to a subpar
process.
In DeWolfe v. Richmond, Maryland’s highest court affirmed the guarantee
of counsel for indigent defendants during bail review hearings. 258 However,
the Maryland Rules authorize the use of CCTV during such proceedings
when held in district court, but not in circuit court. 259 Therefore, in the
district court context, the holding in DeWolfe I and the Maryland Rules act in
opposition to each other. This opposition exists because the use of video in
an adversarial hearing deprives the defendant of his right to counsel and
confrontation.
It is expected that criminal procedure will make technological advances,
but these advances must operate to increase efficiency without sacrificing
254

See Walsh, supra note 9, at 1.
Id. at 9.
256
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 766 (1987).
257
See Seidman Diamond, supra note 91, at 892.
258
DeWolfe v. Richmond, 434 Md. 403, 439, 76 A.3d 962, 983 (2012).
259
See Md. R. 4-231.
255
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fairness. The core concerns that go to the heart of fair and just criminal
proceedings and human dignity are being increasingly overlooked as
technology advances.
CCTV leaves accused individuals without
constitutional safeguards and makes them vulnerable to an erroneous
deprivation of liberty, which uproots the organization of their lives and
negatively affects trial outcomes. As Bryan Stevenson correctly stated:
We will ultimately not be judged by our technology, we
won’t be judged by our design, we won’t be judged by our
intellect and reason. Ultimately, you judge the character of a
society, not by how they treat their rich and the powerful and
the privileged, but how they treat the poor, the condemned,
the incarcerated. 260
CCTV bail reviews strip away the rights and liberty interests of accused
individuals only to further administrative convenience. Sustaining all
constitutional safeguards in a meaningful way will ensure fairness and
integrity, recognizing the humanity of the accused and their inalienable right
to liberty.

260

Bryan Stevenson, We Need to Talk About an Injustice, TED TALKS (March 2012),
http://www.ted.com/talks/bryan_stevenson_we_need_to_talk_about_an_injustice.ht
ml. Addressing the Supreme Court of the United States, Abe Fortas summed it up
best during oral argument in Gideon v. Wainwright:
I do believe that in some of this Court's decisions there has been a
tendency from time to time, because of the pull of federalism, to
forget, to forget the realities of what happens downstairs, of what
happens to these poor, miserable, indigent people when they are
arrested and they are brought into the jail and they are questioned
and later on they are brought in these strange and awesome
circumstances before a magistrate, and then later on they are
brought before a court; and there, Clarence Earl Gideon, defend
yourself.
Oral Arg. Tr. at 4, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

